A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks

Social Networks

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-23

  Braun, Norman ^a   Gautschi, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Model; Nash; Network

Indexed keywords

EID: 28944439125     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.011     Document Type: Article

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