Reasonable utility functions and playing the cooperative way

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 215-234

  Gaus, Gerald F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

fairness; prisoners dilemma; reasonableness; Utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950280578     PISSN: 13698230     EISSN: 17438772     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13698230802021371     Document Type: Review

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