Objectionable thick concepts in denials

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 439-469

  Väyrynen, Pekka ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950222745     PISSN: 15208583     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00179.x     Document Type: Review

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