Economics of malware: Epidemic risks model, network externalities and incentives

2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1353-1360

  Lelarge, Marc ^a  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

END USERS; FREE-RIDER PROBLEM; IN-NETWORK; LOW QUALITIES; MALICIOUS SOFTWARE; MALWARES; NETWORK EXTERNALITY; RANDOM GRAPHS; SECURITY FEATURES; SECURITY SOLUTIONS; SECURITY THREATS; SELF-PROTECT;

ECONOMICS; EPIDEMIOLOGY; INTERNET PROTOCOLS; INVESTMENTS; NETWORK SECURITY; SECURITY SYSTEMS; VIRUSES;

COMPUTER VIRUSES;

EID: 77949590093     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394516     Document Type: Conference Paper

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