Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic electricity markets

IMA Journal of Management Mathematics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 183-193

  Vespucci, M T ^a   Allevi, E ^b   Gnudi, A ^a   Innorta, M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Electricity market; Equilibrium problem; Oligopolistic model

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949439205     PISSN: 1471678X     EISSN: 14716798     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/imaman/dpp004     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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