The politics and institutions of project approval - A critical-constructive comment on the theory of strategic misrepresentation

European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 77-88

  Osland, Oddgeir ^a   Strand, Arvid ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

(strategic) Misrepresentation; Cost benefit analysis; Infrastructure planning; Institutional theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749301680     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15677141     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18757/ejtir.2010.10.1.2869     Document Type: Article

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