Manipulation in planning: The social choice perspective

Journal of Planning Education and Research

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 123-134

  Sager, Tore ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; PLANNING SYSTEM; PLANNING THEORY;

EID: 0033493457     PISSN: 0739456X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0739456X9901900202     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Alexander, E.R. 1982. Implementation: Does a literature add up to a theory? Journalofthe American Planning Association 48(2): 132-35.
2. Alexander, E.R. 1985. From idea to action: Notes for a contingency theory of the policy implementation process. Administration and Society 16(4):403-26.
3. Alexander, E.R. 1992. A transaction cost theory of planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 58(2):190-200.
4. Arrow, K. 1963. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley.
5. Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Bachrach, P., and M.S. Bararz 1963. Decisions and nondecisions: An analytical framework. American Political Science Review 57:632-642.
6. Barbera, S. 1983. Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: A direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. International Economic Review 24(2):413-417.
7. Barbera, S. 1996. Notes on strategy-proof social choice functions. In Social Choice Re-Examined. Volume 2, eds. K.J. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, 26-45. London: Macmillan.
8. Baron, D.P., and J. Ferejohn. 1987. Bargaining and agenda formation in legislatures. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 77:303-309.
9. Bates, J., ed. 1988. Stated preference methods in transport research. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 22(1):136-137.
10. Blair, D.H., G. Bordes, J.S. Kelly, and K. Suzumura. 1976. Impossibility theorems without collective rationality. Journal of Economic Theory 13(3):361-379.
11. Bolan, R.S. 1991. Planning and institutional design. Planning Theory 51 6:7-34.
12. Brand, P. 1980. Manipulation-proofness: A concept for widening the scope of Arrowian welfare economics, both practically and intellectually. Theory and Decision 12(4):325-358.
13. Buckley, M. 1988. Multicriteria evaluation: Measures, manipulation, and meaning. Environment andPlanning B: Planning and Design 15(1):55-64.
14. Dacey, R. 1979. The role of ambiguity in manipulating voter behavior. Theory and Decision 10(l-4):265-279.
15. Dummett, M. and R. Farquharson. 1961. Stability in voting. Econometrica 29(l):33-43.
16. Fainstein, S.S. & N. Fainstein. 1996. City planning and political values: An updated view. In Readings in Planning Theory, eds. S. Campbell and S. Fainstein, 265-287. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
17. Forester,]. 1989. Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
18. Friedmann, J. 1987. Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
19. Gibbard, A. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 4\(4):587-60l.
20. Goodin, R.E. 1980. Manipulatory Politics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
21. Hammond, T.H. 1986. Agenda control, organizational structure, and bureaucratic politics. American Journal of Political Science 30(2):379-420.
22. Hammond, T.H. 1993- Toward a general theory of hierarchy: Books, bureaucrats, basketball tournaments, and the administrative structure of the nation-state. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3(l):120-45.
23. Hammond, T.H., and J.H. Horn 1985. 'Putting one over on the boss': The political economy of strategic behavior in organizations. Public Choice45(l)-A9-7l.
24. Hammond, T.H., and P-A. Thomas. 1989. The impossibility of a neutral hierarchy. Journal of Law, Economics, andOrganization 5:155-84.
25. Hammond, T.H., and P.A. Thomas. 1990. Invisible decisive coalitions in large hierarchies. Public Choice 66(2):101-116.
26. Healey, P. 1997. Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. London, U.K.: Macmillan.
27. Hensher, DA. 1994. Stated preference analysis of travel choices: The state of practice. Transportation 21 (2): 107-133.
28. Krumholz, N., and P. Clavel. 1994. Reinventing Cities: Equity Planners Tell Their Stories. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press.
29. Krumholz, N., and J. Forester. 1990. Making Equity Planning Work. Leadership in the Public Sector. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press.
30. Lindblom, C.E. 1967. Some limitations on rationality: A comment. In Rational Decision (Nomos VII), ed. C.J. Friedrich, 224-228. New York: Atherton Press.
31. March, J.G., and J.P. Olsen. 1986. Garbage can models of decision making in organizations. In Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making, eds. J.G. March and R. WeissingerBaylon, 11-35. Boston, Mass.: Pitman Publishing.
32. McKelvey, R. 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. Journal of Economic Theory 12:472-482.
33. McKelvey, R. I979. General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47:1085-1112.
34. Moore, T. 1978. NVhy allow planners to do what they do? A justification from economic theory. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 44(4):387-398.
35. Moulin, H. 1988. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
36. Odeck, J. 1996. Ranking of regional road investment in Norway: Does socioeconomic analysis matter? Transportation 23(2):125-140,
37. Pattanaik, P.K. 1976. Threats, counter-threats and strategic voting. Econometrica 44(l):91-104.
38. Plott, C.R. 1967. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review 57:788-806.
39. Pressman, J.L., and A. Wildavsky 1974. Implementation. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.
40. Riker, W.H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman.
41. Riker, W.H. 1986. TheArt of Political Manipulation. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
42. Sager, T. 1994. Communicative Planning Theory. London, U.K.: Avebury.
43. Sager, T. 1995. From impact assessment to recommendation: How are the impact assessment results presented and used? Environmental Impact Assessment Review 15(4):377-397.
44. Sager, T. 1997. Planning and the liberal paradox: A democratic dilemma in social choice. Journal of Planning Literature 12(l):16-29.
45. Satterthwaite, MA. 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare (unctions. Journal of Economic Theory 10(2):187-217.
46. Satterthwaite, MA. 1987. Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms. In The New Pa/grave: A Dictionary of Economics, 518-520. London, U.K.: Macmillan.
47. Schofield, N. 1978. Instability of simple dynamic games. Review of Economic Studies 45:575-594.
48. Shepsle, K. I979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. American Journal of'Political Science 23(1):27-59.
49. Shepsle, K.A., and B.R. Weingast. 1982. Institutionalizing majority rule: A social choice theory with policy implications. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 72:367-371.
50. Shepsle, K_A., and B.R. Weingast. 1984. When do rules of procedure matter? Journal of Politics 46(4) .-206-221.
51. Wachs, M. 1990. Ethics and advocacy in forecasting for public policy. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 9 ( 1 -2) : 141 -157.
52. Wildavsky, A. 1992. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. 2nd edition. New York.: HarperCoIlins.
53. Wrong, D.H.I 979. Power. Its Forms, Bases and Uses. New York: Harper & Row.