Consumer feelings and equilibrium product quality

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 137-168

  Iyer, Ganesh ^a   Kuksov, Dmitri ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749291972     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00248.x     Document Type: Article

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