Models of reproductive skew: Outside options and the resolution of reproductive conflict

Reproductive Skew in Vertebrates: Proximate and Ultimate Causes

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 3-23

  Cant, Michael A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 77649342666     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511641954.003     Document Type: Chapter

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