Issues with regional reintegration of the western Balkans

Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 15-29

  Seroka, Jim ^a,b  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of International Security Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649252319     PISSN: 19448953     EISSN: 19448961     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14613190801895912     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. European Commission, Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans, European Commission, Brussels, 2005, p. 2.
2. Southeast Europe Initiative-NATO Fact Sheet, . (10 November 2004).
3. Source: EU and NATO Agree to Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans, NATO Press Release (2003) 089, . (29 July 2003).
4. Source: EU and NATO Agree to Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans, NATO Press Release (2003) 089, . (29 July 2003)., p. 2.
5. See: European Commission, Western Balkans: Launch of First European Partnerships, Annual Report, . (30 March 2004);
6. Reinhard Priebe, Remarks from the Director of the Western Balkans for the European Commission at the 6th Regional Table of the Stability Pact where he stated among other points that: 'The Western Balkan countries must continue to develop regional cooperation, as it constitutes an essential element of the Stabilization and Association Process', . (5 December 2003).
7. 'Regional cooperation remains essential to long-term stability, economic development and reconciliation in the Western Balkans.' Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2006) 649, European Commission, Brussels, 8 November 2006, p. 8.
8. The Western Balkans includes: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
9. Milica Delevic, Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans Chaillot Paper 104, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2007.
10. Judy Batt, The Question of Serbia-Chaillot Paper 81, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2005, p. 66. 'Albanians and Serbs should reconcile like French and Germans: NATO official', AFP, 11 November 2006.
11. For a discussion on the Adriatic Charter, see: Ivan Grdesic, 'US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership: securing the NATO open door policy', Politicka Misao, 41(5), 2005, pp. 104-122.
12. See: Anja H. Ebnoether, Ernst M. Felberbauer and Mladen Stanicic (eds), Security Sector Reform in South East Europe-From a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept, National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, Vienna, 2007.
13. Source: Claudia Grupe and Sinisa Kusic, 'Intra-regional cooperation in the Western Balkans: under which conditions does it foster economic progress', Discussion Paper 37, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London, 2005, p. 11.
14. See: Mustafa Turkes and Goksu Gokgoz, 'The European Union's strategy towards the Western Balkans: exclusion or integration', East European Politics and Societies, 20(4), 2006, pp. 659-690.
15. Martin Dangerfield, 'Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans: stabilization device or integration policy', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5(2), 2004, pp. 203-241.
16. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2006) 649, European Commission, Brussels, 8 November 2006, p. 11.
17. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2006) 649, European Commission, Brussels, 8 November 2006., p. 12.
18. Maurizio Massari, 'Do all roads lead to Brussels? Analysis of the different trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(2), 2005.
19. Fatos Tarifa, 'The Adriatic Europe: Albania, Croatia and Macedonia', Macedonia Quarterly, 16(4), 2005, pp. 8-19.
20. For Serbia, see: Ministarstvo Odbrane Republike Srbia, Nacrt Strategijski Pregled Odbrane, Belgrade, June 2006. For Croatia, see: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, Zagreb, 10 November 2005.
21. See Roy Ginsberg, 'The European Union alone again in the Balkans: an American perspective', Heinrich Boell Stiftung 7th Annual Foreign Policy Conference, Berlin, FRG, 6-7 July 2006. Further evidence for the US abandonment of concern for Balkan security is the absence of any mention of the Balkans in the March 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States.
22. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2006) 649, European Commission, Brussels, 8 November 2006, pp. 6-13.
23. Jim Seroka, 'Security considerations in the Western Balkans: NATO's evolution and expansion', East European Quarterly, 41(1), 2007, pp. 25-38.
24. Source: Commission of the European Communities, Croatia 2007 Progress Report, SEC (2007)1431, European Union Commission, Brussels, 6 November 2007.
25. Ollie Rehn, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, on 8 November 2006 characterized Croatia's status as follows: 'Croatia made a good start in the accession negotiations. However, further efforts are needed, in particular as regards judiciary reform, fight against corruption and economic reform. The road towards EU accession goes really through substantial reforms-it will not be a walk in the park.'
26. Speech by EU Enlargement Secretary Olli Rehn to the European Parliament, 15 March 2006,
27. 'PM Sanader and Busek on Regional Free Trade Zone', Croatia in Focus, 10(11/12), 2006, p. 4.
28. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Republic of Croatia, 'Results of the 11th public opinion poll on the EU', 24 August 2005, .
29. Source: Ibid. The survey did not indicate what proportion of the citizenry was opposed to regional cooperation.
30. European Commission, Eurobarometer 65, Public Opinion in the European Union National Report Croatia, 2006, . and European Commission, Eurobarometer 67, Javno Mnijenje u Europskoj Uniji Proljece 2007, .
31. Source: GFK Centar za istrazivanje trzista, 'Stavovi prema Europskoj Uniji', .
32. Sources: Ibid.; op. cit. Eurobarometer 65 and op. cit. Eurobarometer 67.
33. 'Protiv ulaska Hrvatske u NATO 47.4 posto gradana', Jutarnji List, 26 October 2006; Gradani o clanstvu u Nato Savezu, 28 March 2007 and 26 June 2007, .
34. Sources: 'Protiv ulaska Hrvatske u NATO 47.4 posto gradana', Jutarnji List, 26 October 2006; Gradani o clanstvu u Nato Savezu, 28 March 2007 and 26 June 2007, . and GFK, op. cit.
35. Source: 'CEFTA agreement a sign of enhanced regional co-operation', Southeast European Times, 26 April 2006.
36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia, Foreign Policy Bilateral Issues-Croatia, .
37. At a 2006 conference at Harvard University attended by both Presidents Tadic and Mesic, President Mesic was quoted as follows: 'I am not saying that there are no obstacles. I am not saying that there are not those people, on both sides, that would rather return to confrontations and international isolation, but our relations have progressed so much that something like that is hard to fathom, not to say impossible.' Source: 'Tadic and Mesic talk cooperation', Radio B92, . (23 September 2006).
38. 'Croatia assures EU return of Balkan war refugees is a priority', International Herald Tribune, 5 October 2006.
39. The Beogradski centar za ljudske prava reported that in years 2003-2006, 63-69 per cent of the public did not agree that the ICTY would try Serb indictees impartially. Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 'Public opinion in Serbia: views on domestic war crimes, judicial authorities, and the Hague Tribunal', December 2006, .
40. Source: Republic of Serbia, EU Integration Office, 'European orientation of the citizens of Serbia', Belgrade, 31 June 2007, .
41. TNS Medium Gallup reports that 59 per cent of the Serb public opposes extradition of Mladic to The Hague.
42. Source: Republic of Serbia (2007), TNS Medium Gallup reports that 59 per cent of the Serb public opposes extradition of Mladic to The Hague.
43. Source: J. Batt, TNS Medium Gallup reports that 59 per cent of the Serb public opposes extradition of Mladic to The Hague., p. 60.
44. Only 26 per cent of the Serb public in September 2007 indicated that they would support membership in both the EU and NATO, and an additional 35 per cent favoured accession to the EU alone. Source: Centar za slobodne izbore I demokratiju, 'Research of public opinion in Serbia: early autumn 2007', . (September 2007).
45. Source: Republic of Serbia, Serbian European Integration Office (2007), op. cit.
46. Source: Commission of the European Communities, Serbia 2007 Progress Report, SEC (2007)1435, European Union Commission, Brussels, 6 November 2007, pp. 7-15.
47. Source: Centar za slobodne izbore I demokratiju, op. cit., p. 13.
48. Source: Centar za slobodne izbore I demokratiju, 'Political divisions and value orientations of citizens of Serbia', Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, Belgrade, 2005, pp. 15-18, . (November 2005).
49. Transparentnost Srbija, 'Trust of Serbia's citizens in political processes and institutions', Transparentnost Srbija, Belgrade, 2006, . (March 2006).
50. Source: Centar za slobodne izbore I demokratiju, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
51. A good analysis of this problem is available in Steven Burg, 'Prospects for democratic politics in post-Kosovo Serbia', IREX Short Term Travel Grant Report 2006-2007, .
52. Source: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju (2007), op. cit., p. 24.