RATIONALITY ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Volumn 158, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 261-353

  Leslie, Christopher R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 77649251552     PISSN: 00419907     EISSN: 19428537     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (375)

1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii-x (2d ed. 2001)
2. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 134 (2005).
3. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (2003).
4. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (1998) (stating that departures from the rationality model would have to be random so as not to weaken the power of the analysis).
5. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 487, 488 (1994) (book review).
6. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) ("There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-andeconomics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is and is not.").
7. See Amitai Etzioni, How Rational We?, 2 SOC. F. 1, 2 (1987) ("While over seventy different definitions [of rationality] have been advanced, only very few are widely used.").
8. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1060.
9. See Etzioni, supra note 9, at 2 ("Dominant among [the various definitions of rationality] is the core proposition that rational individuals act consistently, choose the means most suitable to their goals, and act on behalf of their self-interest.");
10. see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (1998)
11. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 113, at 140 (3d ed. 2006) ("[B]usiness firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers....");
12. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1066 ("Nearly all law-and-economics literature on business organizations, following the neoclassical economic theory of firms, is built on the explicit or implicit assumption that firms seek to maximize profits." (footnote omitted).
13. See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty- First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 514 (2007)
14. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 119 (1978).
15. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1070 ("Organizations will seek to maximize profits, and those that fail to do so will be put out of business by a lack of customers, capital, or both.").
16. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
17. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
18. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 342-43, 343 n.13 (1982).
19. 475 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1986).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).
21. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1992).
22. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
23. See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
24. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
25. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
26. 509 U.S. at 216-17.
27. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992).
28. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225.
29. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999).
30. See, e.g., Nat'l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1998)
31. C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1996)
32. aff'd, 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998).
33. Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 526 (D.S.C. 1996).
34. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 523.
35. 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
36. 522 U.S. at 17.
37. See Timothy K. Smith, More Coke Sellers Consider a Return to Original Drink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 13
38. Rich Smith, GM's Dumbest Move Yet, MOTLEY FOOL, June 9, 2004, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2004/06/09/gms-dumbest-move-yet.aspx.
39. ADAM HOROWITZ ET AL., THE DUMBEST MOMENTS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 38-39 (2004).
40. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1055 ("There is simply too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory.").
41. Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1706 (1998).
42. See Stucke, supra note 13, at 528-29 (describing such behavior as "contrary to the tenets of wealth-maximization").
43. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 2003 (2002) ("[I]ndividual-level research findings cannot simply be assumed to apply to group-type decisions.").
44. Stucke, supra note 13, at 515.
45. Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1783 (1998).
46. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1124.
47. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505 (2002).
48. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091
49. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998).
50. See Tor, supra note 73, at 506 & n.94.
51. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095.
52. See Tor, supra note 73, at 506-07 (noting that participants believed that their performance in an investment game had equaled market performance even though, on average, they had performed significantly worse than the market).
53. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 2.
54. Tor, supra note 73, at 508-09.
55. See Arlen, supra note 70, at 1773.
56. See Tor, supra note 73, at 512.
57. Todd R. Zenger & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Compensating for Innovation: Do Small Firms Offer High-Powered Incentives That Lure Talent and Motivate Effort?, 25 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 329, 335 (2004).
58. See Tor, supra note 73, at 516 (identifying this approach as the "inside view" and noting that it "is especially likely to make entrants insensitive to background market predictors").
59. Robert H. Frank, Shrewdly Irrational, 2 SOC. F. 21, 23 (1987).
60. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (1998);
61. see also Frank, supra note 90, at 23
62. Posner, supra note 91, at 1573.
63. Frank, supra note 90, at 38.
64. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 1997).
65. See Rubin, supra note 66, at 1714-15 ("The extent to which such bounded rationality approaches optimality depends upon the operation of external forces.").
66. see also Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1477 (suggesting that flaws in human memory limit the ability of people to mimic utilitarian models of action).
67. See Richard Craswell & Mark R. Fratrik, Predatory Pricing Theory Applied: The Case of Supermarkets vs. Warehouse Stores, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1985) (stating that, when warehouse stores enter a market, "even though the initial decision... seemed rational, the warehouse store may realize after entry that it made a bad decision").
68. See John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996) (explaining that, ultimately, ADM and four other companies "had been illegally colluding on lysine prices around the world for three years"), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 300, 300 ( John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2009).
69. See JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND 136 (2000) (explaining that ADM's foray "into the world lysine market... was a big gamble because of the 'Asian Cartel,' which for decades had controlled the manufacture and trade of the amino acid").
70. See Connor, supra note 99, at 316 ("Had the Asian manufacturers not agreed to join an ADM-dominated cartel, ADM might well have continued predatory pricing beyond June 1992.").
71. See LIEBER, supra note 103, at 146.
72. See Connor, supra note 99, at 310 ("ADM did earn approximately $200 million in profits from the cartel over three years with its one-third share of sales in the worldwide lysine market.").
73. See EARLE GRAY, THE GREAT URANIUM CARTEL 161-62 (1982) (detailing Australia's belated entry into the uranium cartel by means of the threat of underpricing).
74. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 549- 51 (2004).
75. See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 254 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting testimony of Mr. E.K. Davis, President of Alted, Alcoa's Canadian affiliate).
76. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 314 (2001). The act of refusing to give price quotes-while helpful in preventing cheating on a price-fixing agreement-was sufficiently irrational to attract attention that led to complete exposure of the cartel, guilty pleas by participants to criminal charges, and significant civil liability.
77. Leslie, supra note 111, at 570 (citing STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 491).
78. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 450.
79. Leslie, supra note 111, at 572 (citing CONNOR, supra note 114, at 223-24).
80. See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 225
81. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) ("It is a well-established proposition that if any member of the [cartel] agreement can secretly violate it, he will gain larger profits than by conforming to it.").
82. See Leslie, supra note 111, at 611-13 (noting reporting mechanisms used by the lysine, vitamin, steel, railroad, and citric acid cartels).
83. See Greta Devos, International Cartels in Belgium and the Netherlands During the Interwar Period: The Nitrogen Case, 18 INT'L CONF. ON BUS. HIST. 117, 120 (1992) (noting that members were made to pay fines to a trustee if they exceeded their quotas).
84. See JOHN E. STEALEY III, THE ANTEBELLUM KANAWHA SALT BUSINESS AND WESTERN MARKETS 35-36 (1993) (describing the somewhat loose system of imposing fines on salt producers who did not adhere to set prices and markets).
85. See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 183 ("If any country exceeded its allotted quarterly production, the cartel required that country's producers to pay into the cartel's common fund a fine....").
86. See JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS & WALTER E. CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM 106 (4th ed., Doubleday, Page & Co. 1920) (1900) (explaining how oversellers were charged fines, and if they refused to pay, the coal mines would stop supplying them with sufficient coal).
87. See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 252-53
88. See Philip C. Newman, Key German Cartels Under the Nazi Regime, 62 Q.J. ECON. 576, 594 (1948)
89. See Daniel Barbezat, Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926- 1933, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 435, 437 (1989) ("The cartel had penalties for production in excess of the quota. The original penalty was $4 per ton....");
90. cf. ERVIN HEXNER, THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL 77 (1943) (discussing the negative effects of failing to set fixed prices and production quantities in the fine and compensation systems);
91. Walter S. Tower, The New Steel Cartel, 5 FOREIGN AFF. 249, 258-59 (1927)
92. See, e.g., CONNOR, supra note 114, at 136 (citric acid);
93. LIEBER, supra note 103, at 148 (lysine);
94. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 264 (aluminum);
95. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946)
96. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. casts doubt on the continuing viability of predatory bidding claims. See 127 S. Ct.1069, 1072, 1077 (2007) (holding that the Brooke Group test for predatory pricing claims also applies to predatory bidding claims).
97. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1986).
98. 63 F.3d 1378, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1995), modified, 74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1996).
99. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 524 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing Great Western).
100. 63 F.3d at 1386.
101. 230 F. 859, 870-71, 875-76 (D. Md. 1916).
102. RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Group, Inc., 260 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
103. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (footnotes omitted).
104. Solash v. Telex Corp., 1988 WL 3587, at ∗8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988);
105. see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 243 (1991)
106. Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 23 n.65 (2007) ("The rationale of this decision is that the judges are ill-fitted to evaluate managerial decisions, given their lack of business expertise.").
107. Int'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989).
108. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996);
109. see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("[B]usiness judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped... to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.");
110. Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 520-21 (2003) ("Business decisions inherently entail risks and uncertainty, and it is neither from an individual investor's nor from a social perspective desirable to discourage directors from engaging in reasonably risky and uncertain ventures that have potential for great profit.").
111. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
112. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989)
113. See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp, Predatory Pricing Analysis: A Practical Synthesis, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 595, 596 (1991) ("The arguments of McGee and Bork to the effect that predatory pricing never happens except in the singular case of a price-setter acting expensively against his own self-interest have been dissolved by scholarship." (footnote omitted).
114. George A. Hay, The Economics of Predatory Pricing, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 364 (1982).
115. See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
116. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986);
117. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 523-24, 527 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita for the proposition that the "Court has expressed extreme skepticism of predatory pricing claims");
118. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (3d Cir. 1995)
119. Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1988)
120. Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Anticompetitive pricing schemes are exceedingly difficult to accomplish: '[T]here is a consensus... that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589);
121. Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court [in Matsushita] suggested that predatory pricing schemes are unlikely to succeed....");
122. Nat'l Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., No. 88-H-426-N, 1989 WL 146413, at ∗7 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 1989)
123. aff'd, 907 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1990);
124. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003)
125. John Roberts, A Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (Supp.) 75, 75-76 (1986)
126. Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REV. 695, 719-20 (1990)
127. Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 298 (1987).
128. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000).
129. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986).
130. See Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 42 (1999)
131. See Leslie, supra note 111, at 599
132. See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A CONTROVERSIAL PRICING PRACTICE 131 (1949);
133. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 190
134. Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 J.L. & ECON. S47, S49 (1989)
135. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946)
136. See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 314.
137. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDUS. ORG. 413, 429 (1996).
138. See Leslie, supra note 111, at 548, 552, 559-60, 599 (providing examples from the steel, shipping, and lysine cartels).
139. Benz, supra note 149, at 714
140. A. Paul Victor et al., The Interface of Trade Competition Law and Policy: Questions and Answers, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 457, 458 (1987) (statement of Gilbert B. Kaplan).
141. Harry First, Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition: The Case of Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1054, 1067 (1987).
142. Oversight and Authorization of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 27 (1989) (statement of Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., former Counselor for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce).
143. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.3, at 15 (7th ed. 2007) ("Rationality means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose... an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have selected....").
144. See T. BURKE, A. GENN-BASH & B. HAINES, COMPETITION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 97 (1988) (noting "strong evidence that goals other than profit maximisation are pursued in manager-controlled organisations");
145. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 357 (1991)
146. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 51 (1980) ("Diagnosis of goals should also be at multiple management levels. There are corporate-wide goals, business unit goals, and even goals that can be deduced for individual functional areas and key managers.").
147. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 550-52, 550 n.139 (1985) (explaining that management decisions may be beneficial to management but not to the firm);
148. Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., Continuities and Discontinuities in Antitrust: The Early 1980's, 1982 ANTITRUST CONF. 12 (statement of Ira M. Millstein)
149. Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 769 (2004) (noting the role that goals other than profit maximization play in management decisions).
150. See Frank, supra note 90, at 24
151. Stucke, supra note 13, at 533.
152. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986).
153. JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 276-77 (1985).
154. Benz, supra note 149, at 708 n.55.
155. RODNEY CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 136 (1979).
156. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Matsushita... created a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory pricing is unlikely to threaten competition.");
157. Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988)
158. See, e.g., M. Steven Wagle, Predatory Pricing, a Case Study: Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 129 (1988)
159. R. Marc Isaac & Vernon L. Smith, In Search of Predatory Pricing, 93 J. POL. ECON. 320, 342 (1985).
160. See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 97, at 40-41 (1985).
161. Wagle, supra note 180, at 109. The author proceeds to note that reputational effects from predation could deter entry. Id.
162. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003).
163. see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 116-17 (2006).
164. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2297-98.
165. John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, Horizontal Practices: The Economic and Legal Context, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 99, at 211.
166. See Rapp, supra note 145, at 602 ("Under these conditions repeated predatory episodes pay off in total even though the defeat of a single rival in any one of them would cost the predator more than it would return in extra profits.").
167. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2300-01.
168. See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Activities During the Clinton Administration, in HIGH-STAKES ANTITRUST 27 n.49 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003).
169. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2301
170. See Kwoka & White, supra note 189, at 211.
171. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2308
172. David Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum, Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 581, 602 (1995).
173. Midwest to AT&T's strategic moves, "not least of which was predatory pricing" (quoting David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 1894-1910, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 543, 567-68 (1994);
174. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
175. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202 (3d Cir. 1995).
176. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
177. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predatory Practices & Monopolization in the Airline Industry: A Case Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 129, 164 (2002)
178. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 165-66.
179. See Dempsey, supra note 201, at 181 ("Northwest has the financial ability to weather a predatory storm longer than a new entrant.").
180. See Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of the "Plug War" and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 33, 41-45 (1982)
181. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2244-45.
182. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1951).
183. See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 636 (1999)
184. United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005).
185. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
186. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted);
187. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Implausibility of predatory pricing schemes was said to flow from the fact that their success is inherently uncertain." (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598).
188. 475 U.S. at 589 (second alteration in original) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981).
189. Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 286 n.6 (1977)
190. See Phillip E. Areeda, Predatory Pricing (1980), 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 897, 903 (1980)
191. See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 97, at 33 ("Factoring such costs into the analysis not only depends on having an accurate measure of those costs, but also depends on the firm's estimate of the length of the price war.").
192. U.S. at 592 n.16 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
193. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621 (2008) (surveying successful cartels and considering agency-cost theory as a means of destabilizing them).
194. See Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961 ("Like most reasonably adept and optimistic criminals, the antitrust violators had hoped to escape apprehension. 'I didn't expect to get caught[, ]'... one of them said."), in WHITECOLLAR CRIMINAL 103, 107 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1968).
195. See generally Leslie, supra note 111, at 586.
196. See Tor, supra note 73, at 522.
197. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095.
198. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
199. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 580 (1998) (footnote omitted)
200. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 297 (1975).
201. Fischhoff, supra note 233, at 297.
202. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095-96.
203. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) (stating that biases are "not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent").
204. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1523 ("[P]hysicians... when asked to assess the probabilities of alternative diagnoses, given a set of symptoms, offer significantly different estimates depending on what they are told the actual diagnosis turned out to be.").
205. Donald C. Pennington, Being Wise After the Event: An Investigation of Hindsight Bias, 1 CURRENT PSYCHOL. RES. 271, 277 (1981) (finding that outcome knowledge affected subjective likelihood assessments among active political-party members).
206. See Clifton E. Brown & Ira Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evaluations of Managerial Decisions, 62 ACCT. REV. 564, 568-75 (1987)
207. Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on Predicting Bankruptcy with Accounting Information, 10 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC'Y 267, 274 (1985) (finding that a report of bankruptcy "increased the perceived likelihood that it would happen");
208. Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 628, 637 (1988) (finding that MBA students forecasting the success of an investment decision were unable, once told, to ignore its results);
209. Terry Connolly & Edward W. Bukszar, Hindsight Bias: Self-Flattery or Cognitive Error?, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 205, 207 (1990) (outlining a study designed to measure the effects of motivational factors in hindsight bias);
210. Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 578 ("[S]ubjects... rate the outcome of more ordinary events, such as whether a business would be successful, as more predictable than they are.").
211. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001) ("Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, they use heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment." (footnote omitted).
212. Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 595.
213. Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1995) (finding that fifty-seven percent of the juror subjects who were told the outcome found the defendant liable as compared to twenty-four percent of the juror subjects in the control group).
214. Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 572 (footnote omitted).
215. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) ("A factfinder should be aware... of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.");
216. Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1385, 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("[H]indsight is often difficult to avoid in determining obviousness of inventions....").
217. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that a showing of securities fraud requires more than a hindsight-based statement of a firm's changed circumstances);
218. Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 616-18 (explaining that federal courts have prohibited the assignment of liability based on hindsight alone).
219. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982);
220. see also Wash. Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1267-68 (D.D.C. 1993) ("Courts recognize that even disinterested, well-intentioned, informed directors can make decisions that, in hindsight, were improvident.").
221. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 (1986);
222. Jessica L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The Rose Acre Recoupment Test and the Search for an Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1767 (1991)
223. 475 U.S. at 592;
224. see also Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case: Tightened Concepts of Conspiracy and Predation?, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1987)
225. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597).
226. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 233 (1993) ("[Confirmation bias] usually refers to a preference for information that is consistent with a hypothesis rather than information which opposes it.");
227. ARTHUR S. REBER, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 151 (2d ed. 1995) (defining confirmation bias as "[t]he tendency to seek and interpret information that confirms existing beliefs").
228. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121 n.26 (2007)
229. Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2007) ("Confirmation bias leads people to accentuate the positive thrust of evidence that accords with their expectations or desires, and to minimize the thrust of evidence to the contrary.").
230. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309;
231. Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2006) ("[B]ecause of confirmation bias, individuals are subject to ignore or discount information that challenges existing beliefs.").
232. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 424 (2003)
233. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (presenting and analyzing examples of confirmation bias in various contexts).
234. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1596 (2006).
235. See Prentice, supra note 254, at 424 n.29
236. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993);
237. Lisa J. Steele, Trying Cases of Mistaken Identity: Advice to Connecticut Counsel Following State v. Ledbetter, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 799, 814 (2007) ("Confirmation bias has caused famous scientists to fail to report easily-visible phenomena that don't fit their expectations and to observe non-existent phenomena." (footnote omitted).
238. See Nickerson, supra note 255, at 192-93 (examining the effect of diagnosticians formulating a small set of hypotheses early in the diagnostic process).
239. Findley & Scott, supra note 253, at 315
240. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004).
241. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 176 n.67 (2007).
242. Findley & Scott, supra note 253, at 311.
243. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986).
244. See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 194 (3d Cir. 1992).
245. 475 U.S. at 587.
246. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.)
247. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587;
248. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1992).
249. 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).
250. In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 119.
251. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
252. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212, 217 (1993).
253. Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 614 (1994).
254. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 214.
255. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2257 ("The list price of nonbranded black and whites rose by seventy-one percent....").
256. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 249-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. See Glazer, supra note 296, at 617-18 ("Specifically, record evidence showed that from June 1984 to December 1989 the list price of all cigarettes, including branded, generic, and subgeneric, weighted according to volume, went up 61 percent at a time when inflation was only 20 percent, demand was falling, and costs were basically constant.").
258. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 235 (noting Liggett's economic expert's testimony that prices increased more quickly than these costs).
259. See Glazer, supra note 296, at 619 ("[T]he cigarette market as a whole was experiencing declining demand and excess capacity during the relevant period.").
260. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. see also Glazer, supra note 296, at 609 ("[S]uccess for B&W did not depend on bringing about supracompetitive prices for the first time;
262. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
264. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 242-43.
265. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
266. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 239.
267. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 780 F. Supp. 322, 335 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
268. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401- 04 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that recoupment was not possible in the egg industry);
269. see also Page I. Austin, Predatory Pricing Law Since Matsushita, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 895, 898 (1990)
270. See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 230 ("For Andreas, the FBI played excerpts of meetings on a tape recorder on which [the conspirators] say incriminating things.").
271. See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1999) ("In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiffs may nevertheless support their claim with circumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism.").
272. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("An agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain 'plus factors' exist.");
273. Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995)
274. Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted).
275. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
276. See supra notes 34-48, 287-316, and accompanying text.
277. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1293-94.
278. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 62 (1994).
279. See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 365 ("A couple of days later, ADM paid a $30 million fine for its role in price fixing in the market for citric acid, an amount that reflected a hefty discount for its cooperation with prosecutors.").
280. In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999).
281. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
282. CONNOR, supra note 114, at 134-35.
283. LIEBER, supra note 106, at 188.
284. CONNOR, supra note 117, at 220.
285. In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1097-98.
286. CONNOR, supra note 114, at 137;
287. see also Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 774-75 (2009) (discussing how price-fixing conspirators destroy documentation).
288. In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1104.
289. In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 125;
290. see also In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1105.
291. David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive Said to Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at C6.
292. In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1106 (quoting In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 137).
293. See supra notes 104-07. Ironically, ADM was criminally convicted for participating in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy.
294. Cartel expert Professor John Connor explains Cargill's role: On October 12, 1996, Barrie Cox was interviewed by the FBI. At the same time, he had been offered immunity from prosecution in return for his complete and truthful cooperation in the FBI's investigation of the citric acid conspiracy.
295. CONNOR, supra note 114, at 140.
296. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2007, at 124 (2007), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ mcs/2007/mcs2007.pdf
297. See Newman, supra note 126, at 577-88 (discussing the German potash cartel of the 1890s).
298. See Leslie, supra note 111, at 548 (observing that cartels during this period are easier to study due to their openness).
299. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 74 (2006)
300. See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 729-30 (2001).
301. See, e.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir. 1981)
302. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
303. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 135.
304. Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1037-38.
305. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 134-35.
306. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
307. See, e.g., Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1993)
308. see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.)
309. See Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1032 ("We are among the majority of circuits to apply... Matsushita... broadly....").
310. See Leslie, supra note 367, at 799 n.222.
311. 141 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1998).
312. No. 05-2237, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96201 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006).
313. See Leslie, supra note 185, at 113-39 (describing the injurious effects invalid patents may have on competition).
314. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (describing the public-good problem associated with invalidating patents);
315. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation- Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687 (2004) (same).
316. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006).
317. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 156 (2008).
318. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
319. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003) (referring to Matsushita as proof of the Supreme Court having "adopted the skepticism of [the] Chicago" School of economic thought that has "long labeled predatory pricing as implausible and irrational");
320. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita in upholding an FCC regulation against charges that it would lead to predatory pricing);
321. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1999)
322. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1205 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita in determining that a firm allegedly engaged in predatory pricing "had no reasonable prospect of recouping any investment");
323. Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Without an economically plausible theory of anticompetitive effect, Stitt was not entitled to reach the jury on the predatory- pricing claim.");
324. Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Absent the reasonable possibility of success in such recoupment, below-cost pricing cannot be anticompetitive....");
325. Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1994)
326. Nat'l Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., No. 88- H-426-N, 1989 WL 146413, at ∗1-2 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 1989)
327. aff'd, 907 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1990).
328. See, e.g., James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155 (2007)
329. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), to refute McGee's conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing).
330. For example, the Court condemned vertical nonprice restraints as per se illegal in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., and then ten years later reversed itself and held that such agreements should be evaluated under the rule of reason. 388 U.S. 365, 388 (1967)
331. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
332. See generally CONNOR, supra note 114
333. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
334. See generally BORK, supra note 12.
335. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
336. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (eliminating per se rule against nonprice vertical restraints);
337. see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (eliminating the per se rule against resale-price maintenance);
338. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997) (eliminating the per se rule against maximum-resale-price maintenance).
339. Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 944-45, 944 n.19 (2002) (questioning the ethics of judicial participation in conferences sponsored by proponents of the law and economics movement).
340. Douglas T. Kendall & Jason C. Rylander, Tainted Justice: How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 65, 69 n.9, 70 (2004) (detailing how private organizations provide gifts to judges that inappropriately entangle them with entities that appear in their courts and advance the interests of their funders). Judicial conferences to advance post-Chicago economic perspectives should be pursued in a manner that minimizes or eliminates such problems.
341. Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987);
342. see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.)
343. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
344. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995)
345. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 790, 814-15 (1946)
346. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590 (noting the strong incentive for coconspirators to cheat in a coordinated-pricing scheme).
347. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.3d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574).
348. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
349. In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999).
350. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 474 (1962)
351. 475 U.S. at 587.
352. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1305-20 (11th Cir. 2003).
353. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM, at vii (1984) ("Complex litigation-antitrust warfare-challenges the credibility of the jury system. There is increasing doubt as to whether a typical jury can comprehend sufficiently to render a rational verdict.").
354. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177, 187
355. AUSTIN, supra note 451, at 7.
356. Donald E. Vinson, Psychological Anchors: Influencing the Jury, LITIG., Winter 1982, at 20);
357. Donald E. Vinson, The Shadow Jury: An Experiment in Litigation Science, 68 A.B.A. J. 1242, 1244 (1982) ("[M]any jurors come to a decision very early in the trial and then seek support for their conclusion.").
358. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966).
359. Hans, supra note 452, at 202;
360. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 206.
361. see also Hans, supra note 452, at 189 ("Full and competent adversarial examination of disputed technical issues, visual aids, and group deliberation may counteract individual errors so that the group decision is a competent one.").
362. Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1511 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
363. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
364. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 935 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
365. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980);
366. see also In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979)
367. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Observa litigation, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 53 (1947);
368. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D. Mass. 2008)
369. See Hans & Albertson, supra note 461, at 1511 ("Nonetheless, experimental research has identified some types of evidence that can be particularly challenging to jurors. Statistical and economic evidence, for example, is difficult to weigh and assess properly, although judges can be just as susceptible to these problems as lay jurors.").
370. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE REPONSIBILITY 168 tbl.6-2 (2000) (presenting the results of a juror survey on business regulation and litigation);
371. Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 332 (1998) ("For example, the public strongly endorses the free enterprise system, seeing it as a necessary precondition for free and democratic government. Americans express support for cultural values underlying a capitalist economy, such as the Protestant work ethic, personal ambition, and competition." (footnote omitted).
372. HANS, supra note 465, at 217.
373. see also Hans & Albertson, supra note 461, at 1507 ("Jurors were deeply committed to an ethic of individual responsibility, and many saw the fact of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits as counter to that ethic. Interestingly, they saw themselves as standing guard against the potential of frivolous lawsuits.").
374. See HANS, supra note 465, at 216 ("[ J]urors are often suspicious and ambivalent toward people who bring lawsuits against business corporations.").
375. Hans, supra note 465, at 330 (emphasis omitted).