Unified government, bill approval, and the legislative weight of the president

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 511-534

  Alemán, Eduardo ^a   Calvo, Ernesto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress; Divided government; Legislative success

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649211975     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414009355534     Document Type: Article

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