A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China

China Economic Review

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 24-37

  Wang, Jiwei ^a  

^a SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

China; Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Shareholder identity; Top executive turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649183899     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2009.08.006     Document Type: Article

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