Rethinking the theory and practice of local economic development

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 311-339

  Schragger, Richard C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 76649100950     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (173)

1. At the heart of this literature is an emphasis on Tieboutian sorting. See, for example. Vicki Been. "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. 91 Colum L Rev 473, 511-17 (1991) (using Tiebout's theory to argue that local governments will be constrained in their ability to engage in predatory land use practices).
2. See generally Paul Peterson, City Limits (Chicago 1981) (analyzing urban public policy as a product of the city's limited ability to constrain the flow of resources into and out of the jurisdiction);
3. William Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 58-61 (Harvard 2001) (arguing that mobile home-buyers are knowledgeable about the amenities available in different locations and can "shop for a community" that best fits their preferences).
4. See, for example, Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron, City Bound: How States Stifle Urban Innovation 231-33 (Cornell 2009).
5. In two prior articles, I touch on the question of how cities form, grow, and decline, but only indirectly. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 Harv L Rev 482. 520-26 (2009) (observing that local economic growth may not be undermined by local redistributionist policies).
6. Richard Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 Va L Rev 1091, 1100-07 (2008) (noting that the diversity and specialization of industry in cities plays an important role in driving growth).
7. See David Schleicher. The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U 111 L Rev *3-6 (forthcoming), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id=1471555 (visited Jan 4, 2009).
8. See also Schragger, 123 Harv L Rev at 492-97 (cited in note 3).
9. See, for example, Barry Weingast. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market- Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J L, Econ, & Org 1,24-25 (1995).
10. But see Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities ch 1 (Random House 1970) (arguing that cities were a necessary precondition for increases in agricultural productivity).
11. See Douglas Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End 215-16 (Yale 2003).
12. See Edward Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in Robert Inman, ed, Making Cities Work: Prospects and Policies for Urban America 22, 25-26 (Princeton 2009).
13. See id at 26-27.
14. See generally Charles M. Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416 (1956).
15. See id at 418-23; Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis at 58 (cited in note 1).
16. See also Weingast, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 5 (cited in note 5) (noting that the mobility of capital gives rise to a diverse array of public goods packages).
17. Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism 49-50 (Harcourt, Brace 1972).
18. But see Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman. Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 Am Econ Rev 817, 818 (2005) (arguing that competition has a polarizing effect, causing cities that are unable to attract mobile capital to abandon business-friendly policies in favor of predation or the interests of existing citizens).
19. See Peterson, City Limits at 25-27 (cited in note 1).
20. See Michael Barbaro and David Chen, Term Limits Get Notice in Crisis, NY Times B1 (Sept 17,2008).
21. See, for example, Richard Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities: On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System. 115 Yale L J 2542, 2564 (2006).
22. For the seminal work along these lines, see generally Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1059 (1980) (detailing "city powerlessness" within the government structure that places both federal and state restrictions on a city's ability to self-govern, tracing this development through history, and arguing for the increased power of cities).
23. See, for example, Frug and Barron. City Bound at 50-51 (cited in note 2).
24. See, for example, David Rusk, Cities without Suburbs 85 (Woodrow Wilson Center 1993).
25. See, for example, Southern Burlington County NAACP v Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A2d 713. 724-25 (NJ 1975) (holding that zoning restrictions may not be employed to eliminate low- and moderate-income housing).
26. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism - Part II: Localism and Legal Theory. 90 Colum L Rev 346 (1990) (criticizing local autonomy as insulating suburbs from the problems of urban poverty).
27. See Robert Inman, Financing City Services, in Inman, ed. Making Cities Work 328, 328 (cited in note 8).
28. This is the causal problem that bedevils the international law and development literature and particularly the "new institutional economics." See Adam Przeworski. The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?. 45 Eur J Sociol 165, 165-68, 185 (2004) (arguing that it is incoherent to argue that institutions cause economic growth because institutions and economic growth have a reciprocal relationship).
29. See Jacobs, The Economy of Cities at ch 1 (cited in note 6) (asserting that agriculture may have originated in cities and pointing out the fallacy of mistaking the results of city economic development for preconditions of this development).
30. See Barney Cohen, Urban Growth in Developing Countries: A Review of Current Trends and a Caution Regarding Existing Forecasts, 32 World Dev 23, 48-49 (2003).
31. National Research Council, Cities Transformed: Demographic Change and Its Implications in the Developing World 362-84 (National Academies 2003).
32. See Schleicher, 2010 U 111 L Rev at *4-5 (cited in note 4).
33. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Random House 1961).
34. See generally id. See also Jacobs, The Economy of Cities at 125-26,129 (cited in note 6).
35. See generally Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (cited in note 23).
36. Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (cited in note 6).
37. Paul Krugman, The Self-Organizing Economy 3 (Blackwell 1996).
38. See also Masahisa Fujita and Paul Krugman, The New Economic Geography: Past, Present and the Future, 83 Papers Reg Sci 139, 140-41 (2004).
39. Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions and International Trade 1-A (MIT 1999) (describing urban economic landscapes as "the result not ot inherent differences among locations but of some set of cumulative processes, necessarily involving some form of increasing returns, whereby geographic concentration can be self-reinforcing"). David Schleicher is the first local government scholar to address this work directly.
40. See generally Schleicher. 2010 U 111 L Rev (cited in note 4). See also Schragger. 123 Harv L Rev at 491-93 (cited in note 3) (discussing economic geography). Schragger. 94 Va L Rev at 1100-06,1156 (cited in note 3) (discussing Jacobs and economic geography).
41. See Krugman, Self-Organizing at 1, 49 (cited in note 26). Compare this description with Jacobs. The Economy of Cities at 129 (cited in note 6) (analogizing the development of a city's economy to the differentiation of cells in a developing embryo).
42. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 9, 22-30 (cited in note 26).
43. Id at 24-25.
44. Id at 22-30.
45. Id at 26-27.
46. See Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier ch 1 (Doubleday 1991).
47. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 37 (cited in note 26).
48. See Fujita and Krugman, The New Economic Geography at 147 (cited in note 26).
49. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 15-22 (cited in note 26). See Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior ch 4 (W.W. Norton 1978).
50. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 18-19 (cited in note 26).
51. See Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities at 275-76 (cited in note 23).
52. See id at 279 (discussing the potential for "unslumming" in lively, diverse neighborhoods).
53. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 39-43 (cited in note 26) (discussing the "spooky" consistency of the rank-size rule in US cities).
54. See also Xavier Gabaix, Zipf's Law for Cities: An Explanation, 114 Q J Econ 739,741-43 (1999).
55. See Krugman, Self-Organizing at 43-46 (cited in note 26). But see Voker Nitsch, Zipf Zipped, 57 J Urban Econ 86 (2005) (reviewing quantitatively the empirical literature on Zipf's Law and suggesting that "cities are on average more evenly distributed than suggested by (a strict interpretation) of Zipf's law").
56. See generally Luis Bettencourt, et al, Growth, Innovation, Scaling, and the Pace of Life in Cities, 104 Proc Natl Acad Sci 7301 (2007) (describing additional regular, scalar relationships across urban systems).
57. Paul Krugman, History versus Expectations, 106 Q J Econ 651,666 (1991).
58. But see Robert Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History 10-16 (Johns Hopkins 1964) (arguing that railroads were not essential prerequisites for economic growth).
59. For a discussion of the Chicago-St. Louis rivalry, see Jeffrey S. Adler. Capital and Entrepreneurship in the Great West, 25 J Interdiscipl Hist 189, 189-93 (1994) (arguing that Chicago emerged as the leading city of the West because it had more extensive connections to the Northeast marketplaces than St. Louis).
60. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West 295-309 (W.W. Norton 1991).
61. See Cronon, Nature's Metropolis at 296 (cited in note 43).
62. Id at 265, 297-309.
63. See Krugman, Self-Organizing at 53,61-73 (cited in note 26).
64. Id at 99-100.
65. For tne best statement of this view, see Robert Inman, City Prospects, City Policies, in Inman, ed. Making Cities Work 1,1-19 (cited in note 8). A similar view holds in the international development arena.
66. For a critique, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr. Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-liberal State, 51 NY L Sch L Rev 801. 814-15 (2006-2007) (criticizing the assumption that markets, not law. will solve global problems and advancing a notion of law as a tool to ensure that individuals participate in the democratic process as citizens rather than mere consumers of services).
67. Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and, Economic Development around the World 21 (Chicago 2009).
68. See, for example, Peterson, City Limits at 210 (cited in note 1).
69. But see Schragger, 123 Harv L Rev at 518 (cited in note 3) (noting that cities can accomplish redistribution when capital is differently mobile). The effect of redistribution on mobile taxpayers is at the center of the debate over the imposition of a "millionaire tax" in New York.
70. Compare Nicholas Confessore., Taxing Rich Won't Necessarily Make Them Flee, Experts Say, NY Times A26 (Mar 19, 2009)
71. Edward L. Glaeser, Will a "Millionaire Tax" Cause an Exodus of Talent?, NY Times Economix Blog (Apr 27. 2009), online at http://economix.blogs. nytimes.com/2009/04/27/will-a-millionaire-tax-cause-an-exodus-of-talent (visited Nov 3, 2009).
72. Krugman, Self-Organizing at 99-100 (cited in note 26).
73. See generally Michael Storper and Michael Manville, Behaviour, Preferences, and Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Resurgence, 43 Urban Stud 1247 (2006).
74. See also Edward L. Glaeser and Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43 Urban Stud 1275, 1275 (2006).
75. Compare Ingrid Gould Ellen and Katherine O'Regan, Reversal of Fortunes? Lower-Income Urban Neighborhoods in the US in the 1990s. 45 Urban Stud 845, 866 (2008) (finding strong evidence that "an urban resurgence of sorts did take place in the 1990s and that it extended to the lowest income neighborhoods," but that higher-income neighborhoods did not experience it).
76. Storper and Manville, 43 Urban Stud at 1249,1251 (cited in note 51).
77. See Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End at 361-63 (cited in note 7).
78. See Storper and Manville, 43 Urban Stud at 1251,1269 (cited in note 51) (noting that none ot the major explanations adequately explain the increasing popularity of both types of cities).
79. Consider local tax rates. While a number of booming cities have low local tax rates, others have relatively higher local tax rates. It is true that struggling northeast cities like Bridgeport. Detroit, and Baltimore are at or near the top in terms of local tax burden. It seems unlikely that the higher tax burden has led to the decline of those cities, however. Rather, the decline of those cities has led to the higher tax burden.
80. For an analysis, see Government of the District of Columbia, Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the District of Columbia-a Nationwide Comparison 30-31 (2007).
81. At best, student achievement during the 1990s shows mixed results. See G. Alfred Hess. Jr, Understanding Achievement (and Other) Changes under Chicago School Reform, 21 Educ Eval & Pol Analysis 67, 79-80 (1999).
82. Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, Introduction, in Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, eds, City Schools: Lessons from New York 1, 3-5 (Johns Hopkins 2000).
83. S. Paul Reville and Celine Coggins, eds, A Decade of Urban School Reform: Persistence and Progress in the Boston Public Schools 133-34 (Harvard Education 2007). As for New York City, the data arguably show some gains starting in 2002.
84. See generally National Assessment of Educational Progress, 2007 Trial Urban District Assessment: New York City Highlights (2007), online at http://schools.nyc.gov/daa/reports/2007-NAEP-TUDA-Results.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2009) (detailing the standardized test results of fourth and eighth graders in New-York City and comparing the results to 2002-2003 levels).
85. But see Diane Ravitch, Mayor Bloomberg's Crib Sheet. NY Times A23 (Apr 10, 2009) (arguing that any gains in the New York City schools have been overstated). City-suburban gaps across all major cities-including Sunbelt cities-are still dramatic.
86. See Sam Dillon, Large Urban-Suburban Gap Seen in Graduation Rates, NY Times A14 (Apr 22, 2009).
87. For a summary of Las Vegas's progress, see Roberta Furger, Full House: The Las Vegas Building Boom Has Stretched the Creativity and Resources of the Fastest-Growing School District in the Nation. Edutopia 31, 33-34 (Sept/Oct 2004).
88. But see Dillon, Urban-Suburban Gap (cited in note 56).
89. See Richard Deitz and Jaison R. Abel, Have Amenities Become Relatively More Important than Firm Productivity Advantages in Metropolitan Areas? 17 (Federal Reserve Bank NY Staff Reports No 344, Sept 2008), online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr344.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2009) (observing that it is difficult for any region to change its relative amenity position over a decade).
90. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J Econ Persp 163,163-67 (2004).
91. See Philip Cook, Crime in the City, in Inman, ed, Making Cities Work 297, 301 (cited in note 8) (noting that "no expert predicted [the decline in crime] and it remains something of a mystery" and noting that the decline of the 1990s made any policy intervention "look good").
92. See id at 301.
93. See Levitt, 18 J Econ Persp at 172-73 (cited in note 59).
94. See Ivan Turok and Vlad Mykhnenko, Resurgent European Cities?. 1 Urban Rsrch & Prac 54,66-72 (2008).
95. See Martin Killias and Marcelo F. Aebi, Crime Trends in Europe from 1990 to 1996: How Europe Illustrates the Limits of the American Experience, 8 Eur J Crim Pol & Rsrch 43,45-54 (2000).
96. See University of Nevada Center for the Analysis of Crime Statistics. Uniform Crime Report Database, online at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/crimestats (visited Nov 4, 2009) (showing dramatic increase starting in 2002).
97. See also Police Executive Research Forum, Chief Concerns: A Gathering Storm-Violent Crime in America (Oct 2006), online at http://www.policeforum.org/ upload/Gathering-Storm-PRINT-Final-110473745-1027200610304.pdf (visited Nov 4, 2009) (describing the recent dramatic rise in violent crime across the country).
98. See, for example, Storper and Manville, 43 Urban Stud at 1250 (cited in note 51).
99. Id at 1248-49.
100. See Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 271-72 (Maemillan Sth ed 1940).
101. See also Storper and Manville. 43 Urban Stud at 1249-51 (cited in note 51).
102. Storper and Manville. 43 Urban Stud at 1249-51 (cited in note 51).
103. See also Edward Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J Econ Persp 139, 147-50 (1998);
104. Masahisa Fujita, Towards the New Economic Geography in the Brain Power Society, 37 Regional Sci & Urban Econ 482, 484-85 (2007). (incorporating knowledge as a force of agglomeration in the field of economic geography).
105. See Storper and Manville, 43 Urban Stud at 1254 (cited in note 51): The disadvantage of emphasizing agglomeration economies is the great weakness we discussed before: the inability to explain the where question, and therefore the inability to draw policy-relevant conclusions. The firms may attract (or create) the labour and a virtuous circle may begin from there, but why do the firms end up where they do?
106. See Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities at 22,50 (cited in note 8).
107. Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (Basic Books 2002).
108. Storper and Manville. 43 Urban Stud at 1252 (cited in note 51).
109. Id at 1253.
110. Id.
111. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities at 50 (cited in note 8). See also Glaeser and Gottlieb, 43 Urban Stud at 1297 (cited in note 51).
112. See Storper and Manville, 43 Urban Stud at 1254 (cited in note 51).
113. See id. See also Deitz and Abel, Have Amenities Become Relatively More Important? at 16-18 (cited in note 58) (estimating that the share ot wage- and rent-compensating differentials attributable to amenities rose slightly between 1990 and 2000, but observing that firm productivity advantages remain dominant and that it is difficult to change a region's relative amenity position over a ten-year period).
114. See, for example, Robert P. Inman, Financing City Services, in Inman, ed. Making Cities Work 328, 349-52 (cited in note 8).
115. Joseph Gyourko, Urban Housing Markets, in Inman. ed. Making Cities Work 123,147-51 (cited in note 8).
116. For the clearest statement ot this view, see Glaeser, Exodus of Talent (cited in note 49).
117. Schragger, 123 Harv L Rev at 514-17 (cited in note 3).
118. See New York Building Congress and New York Building Foundation, New York's Rising Construction Costs: Issues and Solutions 1 (2008) (reporting that nonresidential construction costs in New York City average 60 percent more than in Dallas, 50 percent more than in Atlanta, and that total construction costs tor high-rise office towers can exceed $400 per square foot in New York, compared to $180 in Chicago).
119. New York's overall tax burden places it in the top quarter of big cities. See Government of the District of Columbia, Tax Rates and Tax Burdens at 14 (cited in note 55). New York City residents pay the highest income tax rate in the country.
120. See Josh Barro, NYC Income Taxes Going from Ridiculous to Ridiculouser, Tax Foundation Tax Policy Blog (Dec 5, 2008), online at http://www. taxfoundation.org/blog/show/24013.html (visited Nov 4, 2009).
121. The data arguably shows some gains starting in 2002. See National Assessment of Educational Progress, 2007 Trial Urban District Assessment at 21,24-31. 37, 43 (cited in note 56). But see Ravitch, Mayor Bloomberg's Crib Sheet, NY Times at A23 (cited in note 56) (arguing that any gains in the New York City schools have been overstated).
122. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities at 49 (cited in note 8).
123. Id.
124. Schragger, 94 Va L Rev at 1156 (cited in note 3).
125. See Cronon, Nature's Metropolis at 297-307 (cited in note 43).
126. The collapse of the US financial industry nicely illustrates the mismatch between regulatory scale and effects-national regulation seems both too large and too small considering both the disproportionate local effects of the collapse and its global reach. The gap between local and national effects is endemic. Consider the recent argument about financial industry bonuses: for the city, the bonuses would be a tax boon and any decent mayor would want them to be paid. For the nation, however, the bonuses look like the redistribution of federal tax dollars to the undeserving rich. Mayor Bloomberg can weigh in on the bonus issue, but he has almost no tools to put his preferences into policy.
127. See David W. Chen, Much Vilified, Financial Titans Find a Friend in Bloomberg, NY Times A17 (Apr 14, 2009).
128. David W. Chen, Economist's Forecast: Chance of Change 100%, NY Times A17 (Feb 16, 2009).
129. See Patrick McGeehan, After Reversal of Fortunes, City Takes a New Look at Wall Street, NY Times A19 (Feb 23, 2009).
130. See id.
131. See Yoonsoo Lee, Geographical Redistribution of US Manufacturing and the Role of State Development Policy. 64 J Urban Econ 436,436-37 (2008).
132. See id at 445.
133. See also Terry F. Buss, The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature, 15 Econ Dev Q 90, 97-99 (2001).
134. Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, US and EU Experiences of Tax Incentives, 39 Area 186,189-90 (2007) (reviewing literature).
135. See William Thomas Bogart, The Economics of Cities and Suburbs 237-39 (Prentice Hall 1998) (comparing competition among cities to the "prisoner's dilemma" problem and arguing that while the overall situation would be improved it cities did not invest resources competing with one another, any given city has good reasons to offer location subsidies).
136. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv L Rev 377, 397-98 (1996) (arguing that state tax incentives may provide a benefit to the states if these states are able to attract more businesses, but that incentives do not create a net benefit to the country as a whole because businesses choose one state to the detriment of others).
137. See Enrich, 110 Harv L Rev at 395 (cited in note 94). See also Schragger, 94 Va L Rev at 1139 (cited in note 3). Jacobs thought that "transfer economies"-economies that grow by relocating assets from elsewhere-were a weak basis for ongoing economic development.
138. See Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations 208-10 (Random House 1984).
139. Jacobs, Economy of Cities at 59 (cited in note 6). See also Schragger. 94 Va L Rev at 1101-02 (cited in note 3).
140. Jacobs, Economy of Cities at 67, 97-98 (cited in note 6).
141. Id at 71, 79.
142. See Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 NYU L Rev 575, 577-79 (1999).
143. See id at 613-19.
144. See id at 576-80.
145. See id at 619-28.
146. See Bouianger v Dunkin' Donuts, 815 NE2d 572, 582 (Mass 2004) (enforcing a former franchise owner's agreement not to operate or work for a competing business within five miles of any Dunkin' Donuts establishment for two years). Moreover, Silicon Valley hiring practices might be more constrained than Gilson describes.
147. See Miguel Helft, U.S. Inquiry into Hiring at High-Tech Companies, NY Times B2 (June 3, 2009) (reporting that the Justice Department is investigating allegations that Silicon Valley technology firms have been agreeing not to actively recruit employees from one another).
148. See Douglass North, Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth, 63 J Polit Econ 243, 251 (1955).
149. For an overview, see generally Ted Rutland and Sean O'Hagan. The Growing Localness of the Canadian City, or, On the Continued (Ir)relevance of Economic Base Theory, 22 Local Econ 163 (2007).
150. See also John Adams, Editorial, 29 Urban Geography 741, 742 (2008) (providing a synopsis of economic base analysis and asserting that the approach does not account for large and increasingly self-sufficient metropolitan economies).
151. See Charles M. Tiebout, Exports and Regional Economic Growth. 64 J Polit Econ 160, 161 (1956) ("There is no reason to assume that exports are the sole or even the most important autonomous variable determining regional income.").
152. Charles M. Tiebout, Exports and Regional Economic Growth: Rejoinder, 64 J Polit Econ 169, 169 (1956).
153. See also Charles M. Tiebout, The Urban Economic Base Reconsidered, 32 Land Econ 95, 97 (1956).
154. Rutland and O'Hagan, 22 Local Econ at 165-66 (cited in note 104).
155. Rutland and O'Hagan, 22 Local Econ at 165 (cited in note 104).
156. See Jacobs, The Economy of Cities at ch 5 (cited in note 6) (discussing, for example, how Tokyo's imported bicycle trade gave rise to a market for locally made bicycle parts which in turn led to the domestic manufacture of complete bicycles).
157. See id at 169. For advocacy of this strategy, see Michael Shuman, Going Local: Creating Self-Reliant Communities in a Global Age 52-58 (Free Press 2000).
158. For a review of the import-substitution debate in the context of international economic development, see Henry J. Bruton, A Reconsideration of Import Substitution. 36 J Econ Lit 903, 904 (1998).
159. See Rutland and O'Hagan. 22 Local Econ at 179-83 (cited in note 104).
160. See Joseph J. Persky, Marc Doussard, and Wim Wiewel, Export Orientation and the Limits of Local Sovereignty, 46 Urban Stud 519, 522-23 (2009).
161. See id; Michael Thomas Power, Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies 37 (Island 1996).
162. Paul Kingman, Pop Internationalism 211 (MIT 1996).
163. Persky, Doussard, and Wiewel, 46 Urban Stud at 522-23 (cited in note 110).
164. See also Saskia Sassen, The Global City 20-22 (Princeton 1991).
165. Persky, Doussard, and Wiewel, 46 Urban Stud at 523-24 (cited in note 110).
166. See Jacobs, Economy of Cities at ch 5 (cited in note 6).
167. See id at 245-46. See also Persky, Doussard. and Wiewel. 46 Urban Stud at 519-20 (cited in note 110).
168. Persky, Doussard, and Wiewel, 46 Urban Stud at 525 (cited in note 110).
169. Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End at 363 (cited in note 7).
170. See generally Guian A. McKee, The Problem of Jobs: Liberalism, Race, and Deindustrialization in Philadelphia (Chicago 2009).
171. Id at 15-16.
172. See Richard E. Baldwin and Paul Krugman, Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonisation. 48 Eur Econ Rev 1,1-2 (2004) (arguing that the existing paradigm misunderstands how localities "compete" in a spatial economy characterized by the uneven distribution of economic activity).
173. See also Richard Shearmur, Of Urban Competitiveness and Business Homelessness, 29 Urban Geography 613, 613-15 (2008) (dismissing the idea ot city competitiveness as incoherent).