Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (Still) there

Review of Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 35-71

  Dittmann, Ingolf ^a   Maug, Ernst ^b   Schneider, Christoph ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 76549123743     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfp007     Document Type: Article

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