A Dolev-Yao model for zero knowledge

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5913 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 137-146

  Baskar, Anguraj ^a   Ramanujam, R ^b   Suresh, S P ^a  

^a CHENNAI MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^b INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; DECISION PROCEDURE; DOLEV-YAO MODEL; PROOF SYSTEM; SYMBOLIC REASONING; ZERO KNOWLEDGE; ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF;

COMPUTER PRIVACY;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 76549112304     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10622-4_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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