Party activists, campaign resources and candidate position taking: Theory, tests and applications

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 611-633

  Moon, Woojin ^a  

^a University of California San Diego   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 7644237123     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000213     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. Randall L. Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidates' Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 69-95.
2. Tim Groseclose, 'Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86. Groseclose's model predicts that the greater a candidate's valence advantage is, the more the candidate diverges. The model also predicts that the candidate with the valence advantage converges towards the centre only if the valence advantages are small. As the candidate's valence advantages grow bigger, the candidate will adopt an extreme position around his own ideal position. However, my analysis of senate elections does not support Groseclose's prediction. Senate candidates with valence advantages do not adopt more extreme positions when their valence advantages grow larger. They adopt more moderate policies as their valence advantages grow. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart's analysis of House elections also shows that high-quality non-incumbents are more moderate than other non-incumbents. For details, see Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder Jr and Charles Stewart III, 'Candidate Positioning in US House Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 136-59.
3. Tim Groseclose, 'Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86. Groseclose's model predicts that the greater a candidate's valence advantage is, the more the candidate diverges. The model also predicts that the candidate with the valence advantage converges towards the centre only if the valence advantages are small. As the candidate's valence advantages grow bigger, the candidate will adopt an extreme position around his own ideal position. However, my analysis of senate elections does not support Groseclose's prediction. Senate candidates with valence advantages do not adopt more extreme positions when their valence advantages grow larger. They adopt more moderate policies as their valence advantages grow. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart's analysis of House elections also shows that high-quality non-incumbents are more moderate than other non-incumbents. For details, see Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder Jr and Charles Stewart III, 'Candidate Positioning in US House Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 136-59.
4. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
5. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
6. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
7. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
8. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
9. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
10. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
11. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
12. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
13. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
14. John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, 'Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy', American Political Science Review, 89 (1972), 1256-68; John L. Sullivan and Daniel R. Minns, 'Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination', American Journal of Political Science, 20 (1976), 439-68; Keith T. Poole and R. S. Daniels, 'Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 373-99; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'The Polarization of American Politics', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 1061-71; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'Patterns of Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 228-78; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'Policy Voting in the US Senate: Who is Represented', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989), 381-98; Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper prsented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); Gerald C. Wright Jr and Michael B. Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 567-88.
15. Harold Hotelling, 'Stability in Competition', Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 41-57.
16. Donald E. Stokes, 'Spatial Models of Party Competition', American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 368-77, p. 373.
17. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
18. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
19. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
20. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
21. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
22. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
23. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, 'Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition', Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-30; Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman, 'Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (1991), 115-37; John Londregan and Thomas Romer, 'Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote', in William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich and Norman J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 355-78; Abinash Dixit and John Londregan, 'The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Polities', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1132-55; Stuart E. Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics', Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300; Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models', Public Choice, 103 (2000), 323-36; Tim Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-86.
24. David Himes, 'Strategy and Tactics for Campaign Fund-Raising', in J. Thurber and C. Nelson, eds, Campaigns and Elections American Style (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 62-77.
25. Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Election, 4th edn (New York: Longman, 1997).
26. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
27. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
28. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
29. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
30. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
31. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
32. Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 469-91; Gary C. Jacobson, 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 334-62; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Rebuttal to Jacobson's "New Evidence for Old Argument"', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 363-72; Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 844-907; Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 34-56; Alan Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 401-11; Robert S. Erickson and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 595-607.
33. Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, 'Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibirum Spatial Analysis', in Peter C. Ordershook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989), pp. 49-68; David P. Baron, 'Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 33-47; David Austen-Smith, 'Campaign Contributions and Access', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 566-81; Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman, 'Modeling Negative Campaigning', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 49-61.
34. Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, 'Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibirum Spatial Analysis', in Peter C. Ordershook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989), pp. 49-68; David P. Baron, 'Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 33-47; David Austen-Smith, 'Campaign Contributions and Access', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 566-81; Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman, 'Modeling Negative Campaigning', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 49-61.
35. Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, 'Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibirum Spatial Analysis', in Peter C. Ordershook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989), pp. 49-68; David P. Baron, 'Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 33-47; David Austen-Smith, 'Campaign Contributions and Access', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 566-81; Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman, 'Modeling Negative Campaigning', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 49-61.
36. Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, 'Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibirum Spatial Analysis', in Peter C. Ordershook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989), pp. 49-68; David P. Baron, 'Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 33-47; David Austen-Smith, 'Campaign Contributions and Access', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 566-81; Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman, 'Modeling Negative Campaigning', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 49-61.
37. Cornelius P. Cotter, James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn, Party Organizations in American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1984).
38. Richard F. Fenno Jr, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (New York: Harper Collins, 1978).
39. Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Eric M. Uslaner, The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).
40. Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Eric M. Uslaner, The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).
41. Gerald C. Wright Jr, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting' (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1994); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Eric M. Uslaner, The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).
42. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 'US Presidential Elections 1968-80: A Spatial Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 282-312, p. 283.
43. Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections', in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberger, eds, Probability Models of Collective Decision Making (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Co, 1972), pp. 298-331.
44. John H. Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 974-90.
45. John H. Aldrich and Michael D. McGinnis, 'A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions', Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12 (1989), 437-50.
46. Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism', p. 190.
47. Wright, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting'; Aranson and Ordeshook, 'Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections'; Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism'.
48. Wright, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting'; Aranson and Ordeshook, 'Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections'; Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism'.
49. Wright, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting'; Aranson and Ordeshook, 'Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections'; Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism'.
50. James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Aaron Wildavsky, 'The Goldwater Phenomenon: Parties, Politicians, and the Two-Party System', Review of Politics, 27 (1965), 386-413; Aldrich, Why Parties?
51. James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Aaron Wildavsky, 'The Goldwater Phenomenon: Parties, Politicians, and the Two-Party System', Review of Politics, 27 (1965), 386-413; Aldrich, Why Parties?
52. James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Aaron Wildavsky, 'The Goldwater Phenomenon: Parties, Politicians, and the Two-Party System', Review of Politics, 27 (1965), 386-413; Aldrich, Why Parties?
53. Aldrich, Why Parties? p. 182. Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn also distinguish two types of party activities: 'candidate-directed' and 'institutional support' activities. The candidate-directed activity is directed towards candidates for office and the institutional support activity involves services to sustain the party organization. For details, see Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn, Party Organizations in American Politics.
54. Aldrich, Why Parties? p. 182. Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn also distinguish two types of party activities: 'candidate-directed' and 'institutional support' activities. The candidate-directed activity is directed towards candidates for office and the institutional support activity involves services to sustain the party organization. For details, see Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn, Party Organizations in American Politics.
55. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42.
56. Indeed, the effect of policy moderation on Senate candidates' campaign funds between 1974 and 2000 is negative and statistically significant, controlling for opponent spending, electoral prospect, incumbent advantage and other controlling variables. For details, see fn. 41.
57. The idea of strategic resource contribution implicitly assumes two things: (a) policy moderation affects electoral chance positively and (b) resource contributors (not political scientists) believe that moderate candidates have a higher chance of winning. However, assumption (a) is not supported strongly by empirical data and assumption (b) has not been tested. Policy moderation explains about 2 per cent of the variation in the vote shares of Senate candidates between 1974 and 2000.
58. Wright, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting'.
59. For details, see Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich and Peter Ordeshook, 'An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process', American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 426-48.
60. According to Stokes and Miller, voters are not strongly motivated to ensure that the issue stances correspond to their policy preferences. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, 'Party Government and the Saliency of Congress', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 194-211. Moreover, candidates can hardly modify their policy positions during campaigns. See Aldrich, Why Parties? p. 190. Therefore, by focusing on advertising valence issues, politicians seek to neither hurt their non-supporters nor isolate their supporters. See Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
61. According to Stokes and Miller, voters are not strongly motivated to ensure that the issue stances correspond to their policy preferences. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, 'Party Government and the Saliency of Congress', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 194-211. Moreover, candidates can hardly modify their policy positions during campaigns. See Aldrich, Why Parties? p. 190. Therefore, by focusing on advertising valence issues, politicians seek to neither hurt their non-supporters nor isolate their supporters. See Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
62. According to Stokes and Miller, voters are not strongly motivated to ensure that the issue stances correspond to their policy preferences. See Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, 'Party Government and the Saliency of Congress', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 194-211. Moreover, candidates can hardly modify their policy positions during campaigns. See Aldrich, Why Parties? p. 190. Therefore, by focusing on advertising valence issues, politicians seek to neither hurt their non-supporters nor isolate their supporters. See Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
63. The difference in candidates' spending explains about 50 per cent of the variation in the vote shares of Senate candidates between 1974 and 2000, which indicates how campaign spending affects voter utilities.
64. I assume that candidates maximize votes since the candidates have incentives to win elections with a greater margin in order to 'scare off' strong challengers and to attract more campaign contributions in the next election. See Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, 'Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections Grow?' American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 478-97.
65. Wright, 'The Meaning of "Party" in Congressional Roll Call Voting'.
66. Wright and Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections'.
67. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 'Candidate Positioning in US House Elections'.
68. Green and Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent'.
69. Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.
70. Here I measure policy moderation in terms of a candidate's position relative to the other members of the party. But, the RECEM specifies policy moderation in terms of the candidate's position relative to the centre of the electorate. Since the position of the median voter varies across states, the empirical test might need to control for state ideology. I deal with this issue in the next section. For details, see fn. 45.
71. A simpler measure of candidate policy moderation is to compute a candidate's policy extremism by using the candidate's deviation from the average (or median) Senator's policy position. However, this measure does not capture a candidate's extremism relative to the other candidates who belong to the candidate's party. For example, if the senate median is 0.5, the alternative measure treats equivalently two candidates respectively located at 0.4 and 0.6. However, if the candidate is Republican, the candidate at 0.4 is more moderate than that at 0.6 since the lower score represents less conservatism. Moreover, the alternative measure does not control for the change in deviation between the two parties' median positions across Congress. My analysis in the model focused on the causes for a candidate adopting a more moderate policy positions relative to the other same party candidates, holding constant the change in party positions across Congress.
72. Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone and the National Election Studies, American National Election Study: Pooled Senate Election Study, 1988, 1990, 1992 [Computer file]. 2nd release (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], IPCSR [distributor], 1993).
73. The original variables are v1422 and v1423, which range from 0 to 100. I recode them to a 0-1 range, subtract and rescale so that higher scores indicate more moderation among party activists.
74. To avoid problems in the few cases with no reported spending, I adopt the convention of adding $5,000 to each candidate's spending. For details, see Green and Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent'. I use campaign spending per thousand people instead of per capita to restrict the natural logarithm of campaign spending to the range of positive values. This prevents estimated coefficients from being affected too much by the small number of large negative values when the logarithm is taken. Gerber adds the constant 0.01 to real spending per voter before taking the logarithm to prevent large negative values of the logarithms of campaign spending. The qualitative difference in estimated effects is negligible between the two methods. See Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables'.
75. To avoid problems in the few cases with no reported spending, I adopt the convention of adding $5,000 to each candidate's spending. For details, see Green and Krasno, 'Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent'. I use campaign spending per thousand people instead of per capita to restrict the natural logarithm of campaign spending to the range of positive values. This prevents estimated coefficients from being affected too much by the small number of large negative values when the logarithm is taken. Gerber adds the constant 0.01 to real spending per voter before taking the logarithm to prevent large negative values of the logarithms of campaign spending. The qualitative difference in estimated effects is negligible between the two methods. See Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables'.
76. As I mentioned in fn. 23, holding constant opponent spending, incumbent advantage, electoral prospect, opponent political experience, state population size and candidate party leadership, one unit increase in policy moderation score decreases a Senate candidate's per capita campaign fund by about 31 cents (in 1995 $). The negative effect of policy moderation on campaign funds is not only statistically, but also substantively, significant. Given that the median of Senate election campaign funds per capita is about 88 cents, one unit increase in policy moderation score results in campaign funds decreasing by about 35 per cent.
77. Gerber, 'Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables'.
78. Congressional Quarterly, The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1972-2000).
79. Since there is one endogenous explanatory variable and two true instruments (instrumental variables that are included in the first stage, but excluded from the second stage), there is one overidentifying restriction.
80. As mentioned in fn. 36, it might be necessary to control for the variance in ideology across states. I measure the extent to which a state's ideology is moderate relative to other states' ideologies by rescaling state ideology data compiled by Wright, McIver and Erickson. For details, see Robert S. Erickson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John McIver, 'Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 469-89. Following the same procedure used to measure the MODERATE scores, I compute state ideology moderation scores (STIDEO) such that higher scores indicate more moderate state ideology. Controlling for state ideology moderation works in favour of my expectation of the direction and significance of estimates for all statistical models in this article. For example, the coefficients of the model, MODERATE = -0.044 + 1.01 PARTYM + 0.010INCUMB + 0.014ΔSPEND + 0.447STIDEO + e, are all significant at least at the 0.05 level. The disadvantage of this model is, however, that Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the data since Wright, McIver and Erickson's data do not include these states.
81. The test was performed using a regression-based form of the Hausman test. I first regress ΔSPEND on PARTYM, INCUMB, PROSPC, and STSIZE, and obtain the residuals, denoted by RESIDL. Then I regress MODERATE on PARTYM, INCUMB, ΔSPEND and RESIDL, and obtain the t-statistic on the effect of RESIDL. The t-statistic is -2.221 and the p-value is 0.027. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that ΔSPEND is exogenous at the 0.05 level. For details, see J. A. Hausman, 'Specification Tests in Econometrics', Econometrica, 46 (1978), 1251-71.
82. Including the variable STIDEO in this model produces the following result: MODERATE = -0.051 + 1.02 PARTYM + 0.006 INCUMB + 0.043 ΔSPEND* + 0.455 STIDEO + e. Here, PARTYM, ΔSPEND*, and STIDEO are significant at the 0.01 level and INCUMB is significant at the 0.05 level.
83. 0.052, are all significant at the 0.01 level.
84. Washington Post (10 January 1999).
85. Gary C. Jacobson, 'Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection', in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds, Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), pp. 9-30.
86. Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 177-81.
87. Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model'.
88. Groseclose, 'A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage'.
89. Wright and Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections'; Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, 'Voters, Issues and Candidates in Congressional Elections', in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 5th edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), pp. 91-114.
90. Wright and Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections'; Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, 'Voters, Issues and Candidates in Congressional Elections', in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 5th edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), pp. 91-114.
91. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel
92. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
93. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
94. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
95. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
96. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
97. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
98. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
99. I thank Sarah Birch for raising this important issue. For the literature dealing with the effect of campaigning in Britain, see Dennis Kavanagh, Constituency Electioneering in Britain (London: Longmans, 1970); J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 257-69; J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, 'The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239-60; R. J. Johnston, 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Election in England', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 114-19; R. J. Johnston, Money, and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Electoral Results (London: Croom Helm, 1987); C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261-73; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Strength of Party Identification Among the British Electorate: An Exploration', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 143-55; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britan', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165-74; David Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175-93.
100. Noting the significance of non-policy issues and campaigning in Britain, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina point out that 'national forces such as party loyalty and executive performance play a much larger role' in Britain than in America, but this does not mean that the British believe that constituency services are insignificant. See Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, The Personal Vote, p. 77. Anagnoson also observes that 'the standard pattern of close constituency relationship' exists in New Zealand where 'the party system is among the strongest'. See Theodore Anagnoson, 'Home Style in New Zealand', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8 (1983), 157-75, p. 171.
101. Noting the significance of non-policy issues and campaigning in Britain, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina point out that 'national forces such as party loyalty and executive performance play a much larger role' in Britain than in America, but this does not mean that the British believe that constituency services are insignificant. See Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, The Personal Vote, p. 77. Anagnoson also observes that 'the standard pattern of close constituency relationship' exists in New Zealand where 'the party system is among the strongest'. See Theodore Anagnoson, 'Home Style in New Zealand', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8 (1983), 157-75, p. 171.
102. i, denote a voter's ideal policy position, candidate i's policy position, exogenous non-policy merits, and the candidate's party activist position, respectively. The standard spatial models deal only with the first term (policy issues) of the utility function. If electoral competition revolves around transactions of policy issues only, the relationships between political producers and their consumer are partisan, ideological and programmatic. The second term captures valence issues and the way this term affects voter utility is monotonic increasing, which is similar to the way economic products affect consumer utility. If electoral competition revolves around transactions of valence issues only, electoral competition is distributive and particularistic. Politicians cultivate personal votes and this tendency results in money politics and the undersupply of important collective goods. The third term captures the effect of advertisement and party activism. Spatial models without this term specify electoral competition without parties and campaign processes. The parameters β, γ, and λ respectively capture how fast a voter's utility decreases as his or her candidate deviates from his or her ideal position, the voter's sensitivity to non-policy merits and the extent to which party activists withhold their support when their candidate deviates from them. Thus, we can analyse different voting behaviours and electoral outcomes across countries in terms of these parameters. In the RECEM that I present in this article, I held constant the parameters to one in order to simplify the model.
103. Woojin Moon, 'Strategic (Dis)Advantages of the Centrist Party in Position Taking: Downsian versus Political Transaction Models' (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 2003).
104. B. C. Eaton and Richard G. Lipsey, 'The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition', Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 27-49.
105. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).