On the relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 77-98

  Vincent, Nicole A ^a  

^a DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Criminal law; Neurolaw; Neuroscience; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 75749141222     PISSN: 18719791     EISSN: 18719805     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11572-009-9087-4     Document Type: Article

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