The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 157-177

  Matsusaka, John G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144471126     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4760-1     Document Type: Article

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