Moving the WTO forward-one case at a time

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 223-231

  Howse, Robert ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 75149166981     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (76)

1. See Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case law Versus Statute law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 411 (2008) (modeling Posner's hypothesis that common law tends toward greater efficiency and arguing that evolution of case law provides better outcomes than statutory law).
2. See Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman's Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 193, 210-14 (2008) (discussing how constitutional moments can be interpreted as constitutional failures).
3. See Alan Yanovich, The Evolving WTO Dispute Settlement System, in THE WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA 248, 248-49 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2007) (stating that the factor explaining the success of the WTO dispute settlement system is its ability to evolve).
4. Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 237, 243 (2000).
5. See Richard L. Bemal, Debra P. Steger & Andrew L. Stoler, Comment, Key Procedural Issues: Resources, 32 INT'L LAW. 871, 878 (1998) ("The Appellate Body is often cited as the crown jewel of the WTO DSU . . . .");
6. Anna Lanoszka, The Promises of Multilateralism and the Hazards of 'Single Undertaking': The Breakdown of Decision Making Within the WTO, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 655, 662-63 (2008) (stating that the Cold War mentality influenced the start and completion of the Uruguay Round).
7. The relationship between globalization and the WTO is obvious. See Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1528 (2008) (book review).
8. See Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 357-58 (2002) [hereinafter Humanity's Law].
9. See id. at 360.
10. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 70 (2003) (noting that the post-Cold War period shaped the wave of democratic transitions and modernization associated with the humanity-law revolution).
11. Craig VanGrasstek & Pierre Sauvé, The Consistency of WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geometry?, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 837, 852 (2006) ("GATT and the WTO are based upon the cardinal, Westphalian principle of sovereign equality . . . .").
12. See James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule of Law, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 533, 547 (2003).
13. See id.
14. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
15. See LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 240 (The New Press 2004).
16. Id. at 15.
17. See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Agreement: An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 99, 106-07 (2002).
18. See Humanity's Law, supra note 7, at 369-70 (describing the tension between the Westphalian nation-state system and the increasingly prevalent humanitarian law); see also John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003) ("The old 'Westphalian' concept in the context of a nation-state's 'right' to monopolize certain exercises of power with respect to its territory and citizens has been discredited in many ways . . . .").
19. But see Stephen D. Krasner, Abiding Sovereignty, 22 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 229, 231 (2001) (arguing that globalization and the rise of other transnational actors will alter but not weaken state sovereignty in international relations).
20. See A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133-34 (2001) (arguing that the inability of Westphalian notions of state sovereignty to adapt to changes in international law has led to a legitimacy crisis).
21. See Robert Howse, WTO Governance and the Doha Round, 5 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 5-6 (2005) (describing the WTO trend toward accepting input from other institutions and allowing more transparency in its negotiations).
22. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 456-59 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Penguin Putnam Inc. 2004) (1835) (explaining how the American people do not change their underlying principles, but instead make small, progressive adjustments).
23. Id.
24. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 197 (2005) ("Under the current rules, [amicus curiae] do not have the right to be heard or to participate, in any way, in the proceedings."). See generally DSU.
25. See Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 11105-108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (hereinafter Shrimp Appellate Body Report] (finding that Articles 12.1 and 13 of DSU allow the panel to consider whether to accept information and advice from unsolicited sources);
26. see also Eric L. White, Written and Oral Submissions in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES & LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS 121, 127 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).
27. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 51, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body Report] (nothing that in November 2000 the Appellate Body adopted an additional procedure to deal with amicus briefs);
28. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 164-167, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (accepting an amicus brief from a WTO member);
29. Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, ¶¶ 38-42, WT/DS138/ AB/R (May 10, 2000) ( ruling that the Appellate Body itself has the authority to accept and consider amicus briefs).
30. But see General Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22 November 2000, ¶¶ 114-118, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23, 2001) (addressing members' concerns that "since there was no specific provision regarding amicus briefs such briefs should not be accepted").
31. See Petko D. Kantchevski, Note, The Differences Between the Panel Procedures of the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels in Trade Dispute Settlement, 3 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 79, 127 (2006);
32. see, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000) (discussing the increasing trend of amicus brief influence collectively, but failing to mention an individual brief relied on for an decision).
33. See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 338-45 (2008) (describing amicus participation on the democratic system framework and citing different types of active amicus groups);
34. Joseph Keller, The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Future Developments, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 449, 456-62 (2005) (describing the benefits of amicus briefs).
35. See Lanoszka, supra note 5, at 668 (stating that the WTO is a member-driven organization).
36. DSU arts. 14, 17.10, 18.2.
37. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 22, at 213.
38. See Appellate Body Report, European Community-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report].
39. Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, United States- Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/8, WT/DS321/8 (Aug. 2, 2005).
40. DSU arts. 14, 18.2.
41. Id. art. 17.10.
42. See Mareike Meyn, The WTO Doha Round Impasse (Overseas Dev. Inst., London), Sept. 2008, at 1-2.
43. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court": Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 633-34 (2002).
44. See Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 130, 133-35 (giving examples where the Appellate Body judiciary has adapted to new interpretations of legitimate government actions under the WTO agreement).
45. See id.
46. See Peter Fuchs & Klaus Schilder, Watch Out Beyond the WTO: The EU's Aggressive Multi-Level Trade Agenda, WEED (World Econ. Ecology & Dev., Germany), Oct. 2004, at 1, available at http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/ Watch%20out%20beyond%20the%20WTO.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Areas, Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes: Going Regional or Global?, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (2007) (noting that in the WTO Canada- Patent Term case where either forum was arguably proper, the United States chose the WTO settlement system over the regional NAFTA settlement process).
48. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 356 (2004) (describing how the WTO "provid[es] virtual representation for the public's interest in free trade").
49. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/ DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
50. Id. ¶¶ 7.76-7.78.
51. EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 30, ¶ 124.
52. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (2003) (describing the precautionary principle as "[u]ntil safety is established, be cautious; do not require unambiguous evidence").
53. EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 30, ¶ 124.
54. See Morton H. Halperin & Kristen Lomasney, Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record, 9J. DEMOCRACY 134,143 (1998) (indicating a suppression of democracy in Burma);
55. John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett & Michael L. Berbaum, Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992, 47 INT'L STUD. Q. 371, 388 (2003) (indicating that China is not democratic);
56. Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 333 (2001) (indicating that Saudi Arabia is not democratic).
57. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 845 (2002) (discussing the deference the WTO accords to national health policies because of a state's duty to protect its citizens' health).
58. See generally Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24.
59. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
60. National treatment is the prohibition on less favorable treatment of imported products in relation to "like" domestic products. See id. art. III:4
61. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24, ¶ 114.
62. GATT art. XX.
63. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶¶ 8.129-8.130, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
64. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24, ¶¶ 117-123.
65. Id. ¶ 172.
66. GATT art. XX.
67. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 6, at 1547.
68. See id.
69. See generally Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23.
70. Id. ¶¶ 131-135 (referring to one of a handful of major instruments on biodiversity, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243). Environmental NGOs influenced the negotiation of these international instruments on biodiversity. See id.
71. For a list of parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see List of Parties, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
72. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 89-91.
73. See Yanovich, supra note 3, at 248-49.
74. For example, the Appellate Body has interpreted the DSU as permitting participation of non-governmental actors via the use of appellate briefs. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24 (demonstrating the Appellate Body's ability to consider the health effects of a governmental decision from the point of view of the consumer).
76. See, e.g., Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23.