Mechanisms and downward causation

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 22, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 595-609

  Kistler, Max ^a  

^a UNIV GRENOBLE ALPES   (France)

Author keywords

Bottom up; Completeness; Constitution; Constraint; Downward Causation; Interlevel; Mechanism; Top down

Indexed keywords

EID: 74949098765     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080903238914     Document Type: Article

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