Constituting global leadership: Which countries need to be around the summit table for climate change and energy security?

Global Governance

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 21-37

  Carin, Barry ^a   Mehlenbacher, Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 74949090218     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: 19426720     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01601003     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. It is taken as read that final authoritative decisions would be taken by the only legitimate forums-the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations.
2. Enrique Rueda-Sabater, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Robin Kraft, "AFresh Look at Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation," Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 160, February 2009.
3. The G-20 includes the G8 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey (the European Union in a member of both the G-20 and the G8).
4. Nicholas Bayne, "G8 Process and Performance: Past, Present, and Future," in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona, and John Kirton, eds., Corporate, Public, and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2007).
5. Barry Carin and Gordon Smith, Making Change Happen at the Global Level (Ottawa: IDRC, 2004)
6. Paul Martin, "A Global Answer to Global Problems," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
7. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)
8. Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1970).
9. Two examples are Scott Barrett, "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers 46 (1994): 878-894
10. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco, "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," Journal of Public Economics 52 (1993): 309-328.
11. Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans, and Michael Finus, "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," Review of International Organizations 1 (2006): 379-396.
12. One of many critiques is contained in David Victor, "Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures," in Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins, eds., Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World (New York: Cambridge, 2007), pp. 133-160.
13. Farsighted studies include Marco Mariotti and Licun Xue, "Farsightedness in Coalition Formation," in Carlo Carraro, ed., The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2003), pp. 128-155
14. Giulio Ecchia and Marco Mariotti, "The Stability of International Environmental Coalitions with Far-sighted Countries: Some Theoretical Observations," in Carlo Carraro, ed., International Environmental Agreements: Strategic Policy Issues (1998), pp. 172-192.
15. Issue linkages were called tie-ins by Fred Iklãcopy; in How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper, 1964); a good summary is contained in
16. Eric Neumayer, "How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other," Global Environmental Politics 1, no. 1 (2001): 122-147
17. Using linkages to overcome barriers to agreement is recommended by James Sebenius, "Dealing with Blocking Coalitions and Related Barriers to Agreement: Lessons from Negotiations on the Oceans, the Ozone, and the Climate," in Kenneth Arrow, Robert Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky, and Robert Wilson, eds., Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 150-182.
18. Carlo Carraro and Carmen Marchiori, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations," in Carlo Carraro and Vito Fragnelli, eds., Game Practice and the Environment (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 65-86.
19. Barbara Buchner, Carlo Carraro, Igor Cersosimo, and Carmen Marchiori, Back to Kyoto? United States Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation," in Alain Haurie and Laurent Viguier, eds., The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), pp. 173-204
20. show that countries will cooperate with the United States on R&D even though the United States free-rides on climate cooperation.
21. Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni, "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," Journal of International Economics 57 (2002): 423-447.
22. Giancarlo Spagnolo, "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," Discussion Paper No. 2778 (United Kingdom: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2001)
23. Michael Finus, Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (United Kingdom: Elgar, 2001), pp. 113-117.
24. Bradnee Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (New York: United Nations University Press, 2008).
25. Alexander Betts, "North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime: The Role of Linkages," Global Governance 14 (2008): 157-178.
26. L-20 Leaders Forum, "The Deal" (2008), available at www.l20.org/publications/The_Deal.pdf. Of course, it is important to note that once the L-20 leaders are in the meeting, they may bring forward new issues that are not on the agenda. Paul Martin has stressed that the L-20 meetings should be informal, for example in "A Global Answer to Global Problems," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005. James Sebenius discusses shifting agendas in a chapter titled "Negotiation Analysis" in Vic-tor Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), pp. 203-215.
27. This approach is described in detail in Victor, "Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations."
28. An example of this type of effort for issue linkage is in Buchner et al., "Back to Kyoto?"
29. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); Sebenius, "Negotiation Analysis."
30. Paul Martin, "Globalization and Summit Reform: A Leader's View," afterword in Peter Heap, Globalization and Summit Reform (New York: Springer, 2008), pp. 71-74.
31. Robert Mnookin, "Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2003): 199-220.
32. Robert Mnookin, "Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2003): 199-220.
33. A concise presentation is in www.l20.org/publications/The_Deal.pdf. A comprehensive selection is in Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins, Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World (New York: Cambridge, 2007). A goal-oriented approach by the Carbon Mitigation Initiative is at www.princeton.edu/cmi/ and summarized in Robert Sokolow and Stephen Pacala, "A Plan to Keep Carbon in Check," Scientific American, September 2006: 50-57.
34. "Failed States Index," Foreign Policy (2009), available at www.foreignpolicy.com/images/090624_2009_final_data.pdf.
35. Mnookin, "Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution."