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American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volumn 91, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1218-1223
Incentive pay for CEOS in cooperative firms
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE SECTOR; EQUITY; FIRM OWNERSHIP; INCENTIVE; INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE; MANAGEMENT PRACTICE;
EID: 74549171719     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01287.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (23)
References (11)
  • 1
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    • Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts
    • Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. Murphy. 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4):1125-1156
    • (1994) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.109 , Issue.4 , pp. 1125-1156
    • Baker, G.1    Gibbons, R.2    Murphy, K.3
  • 2
    • 0141761218 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: Evidence from the hospital industry
    • Ballou, J., and B. Weisbrod. 2003. "Managerial Rewards and the Behavior of For-profit, Governmental, and Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from the Hospital Industry." Journal of Public Economics 87:1895-1920.
    • (2003) Journal of Public Economics , vol.87 , pp. 1895-1920
    • Ballou, J.1    Weisbrod, B.2
  • 3
    • 0001201270 scopus 로고
    • The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts
    • Bull, C. 1987. "The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1):147-159
    • (1987) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.102 , Issue.1 , pp. 147-159
    • Bull, C.1
  • 4
    • 84888794803 scopus 로고
    • Arm's length relationships
    • Crémer, J. 1995. "Arm's Length Relationships." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(2): 275-296
    • (1995) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.110 , Issue.2 , pp. 275-296
    • Crémer, J.1
  • 5
    • 74549220791 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Objective functions and compensation structures in nonprofit and for-profit organizations: Evidence from the mixed hospital industry
    • Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press In E. Glaeser, ed
    • Erus, B., and B. Weisbrod. 2003. "Objective Functions and Compensation Structures in Nonprofit and For-profit Organizations: Evidence from the "Mixed" Hospital Industry." In E. Glaeser, ed. The Governance of Not-for-Profit Firms. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 117-142
    • (2003) The Governance of Not-for-Profit Firms , pp. 117-142
    • Erus, B.1    Weisbrod, B.2
  • 6
    • 0000139691 scopus 로고
    • Moral hazard and observability
    • Holmström, B. 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics 10(1):74-91.
    • (1979) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.10 , Issue.1 , pp. 74-91
    • Holmström, B.1
  • 7
    • 74549148075 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive compensation in Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin cooperatives: A follow-up study
    • King, R., D. Trechter, and D. Cobia. 1998. "Executive Compensation in Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin Cooperatives: A Follow-Up Study." Journal of Cooperatives 13:35-43.
    • (1998) Journal of Cooperatives , vol.13 , pp. 35-43
    • King, R.1    Trechter, D.2    Cobia, D.3
  • 9
    • 77951519785 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive compensation
    • Amsterdam: Elsevier Science O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds.
    • Murphy, K. 1999. "Executive Compensation." In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds.Handbookof Labor Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 2485-2563.
    • (1999) Handbook of Labor Economics , pp. 2485-2563
    • Murphy, K.1
  • 11
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    • The tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives
    • Prendergast, C. 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 110(5):1071-1102.
    • (2002) Journal of Political Economy , vol.110 , Issue.5 , pp. 1071-1102
    • Prendergast, C.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.