Making the world safe for hypocrisy?

Polity

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 3-30

  Dovi, Suzanne ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 7444225432     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235505     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. For a contemporary discussion of personal hypocrisy, see Andrew Stark, "Limousine Liberals, Welfare Conservatives: On Belief, Interest, and Inconsistency in Democratic Discourse," Political Theory 25 (August 1997): 475-502.
2. According to my view, a person does not have to be a politician in order to count as a political actor. Appointees, cabinet members, and other institutional roles in a state are also capable of political hypocrisy.
3. Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 34.
4. Judith Shklar insists that "liberal and humane people . . . would, if they were asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the worst thing we do" in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 44. Shklar's ordering of these vices has captured the imagination of such political theorists as Richard Rorty and Annette Baier. See Annette Baier, "Moralism and Cruelty," Ethics 103 (April 1993): 436-457; and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a critique of the relationship between liberalism and cruelty, see John Kekes, Against Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), ch. 9.
5. Judith Shklar insists that "liberal and humane people . . . would, if they were asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the worst thing we do" in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 44. Shklar's ordering of these vices has captured the imagination of such political theorists as Richard Rorty and Annette Baier. See Annette Baier, "Moralism and Cruelty," Ethics 103 (April 1993): 436-457; and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a critique of the relationship between liberalism and cruelty, see John Kekes, Against Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), ch. 9.
6. Judith Shklar insists that "liberal and humane people . . . would, if they were asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the worst thing we do" in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 44. Shklar's ordering of these vices has captured the imagination of such political theorists as Richard Rorty and Annette Baier. See Annette Baier, "Moralism and Cruelty," Ethics 103 (April 1993): 436-457; and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a critique of the relationship between liberalism and cruelty, see John Kekes, Against Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), ch. 9.
7. Judith Shklar insists that "liberal and humane people . . . would, if they were asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the worst thing we do" in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 44. Shklar's ordering of these vices has captured the imagination of such political theorists as Richard Rorty and Annette Baier. See Annette Baier, "Moralism and Cruelty," Ethics 103 (April 1993): 436-457; and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a critique of the relationship between liberalism and cruelty, see John Kekes, Against Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), ch. 9.
8. Judith Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear," Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 29.
9. Shklar recognizes that hypocritical behavior is morally suspect and that hypocrisy can blind liberal citizens to cruelty, yet she still maintains that liberals must continue to rank eliminating cruelty over hypocrisy: "Because cruelty is made easier by hypocrisy and self-deception, these two vices are bound to stand high on the list that begins with cruelty" (Ordinary Vices, 12).
10. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 181.
11. This example has a lot of currency in the philosophic literature on hypocrisy. Both Judith Shklar and Eva Feder Kittay build their arguments that hypocrisy should not be understood as an opprobrium by using this example. See Eva Feder Kittay, "On Hypocrisy," Metaphilosophy 13 (1982): 277-89. This case is exceptional, though, in a number of ways. First, its moral currency comes from a (rightful in my opinion) consensus that racism is an unqualified evil. The extent to which the hypocrite's non-hypocritical behavior would contribute to that evil necessitates that hypocrisy cannot be all that bad. However, the political realm does not typically rest on issues that generate such a strong moral consensus. What is frustrating and interesting about hypocrisy is the extent to which it can appeal to the values that it seeks to undermine. Consequently, I would concede that cases like the racist citizen who does not act racist could bolster the practice of liberal values; however, such examples do not account for the extent to which a general perception that political elites do not mean what they say and consistently act in ways that undermine the values to which they publicly subscribe is malignant to liberal democracies. As I will argue below, such an acceptance of hypocrisy as a way of life is unhealthy for liberal political institutions.
12. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 77-78.
13. For example, some have accused Noam Chomsky's The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999) of exposing U.S. hypocrisy while failing to specify the proper course of action in cases of genocide. See Aryeh Neier, "Inconvenient Facts," Dissent (Spring 2000): 109-12.
14. For example, some have accused Noam Chomsky's The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999) of exposing U.S. hypocrisy while failing to specify the proper course of action in cases of genocide. See Aryeh Neier, "Inconvenient Facts," Dissent (Spring 2000): 109-12.
15. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 48
16. Shklar, Freedom and Independence, 193.
17. Shklar, Freedom and Independence, 193.
18. Dennis Thompson understands Judith Shklar's argument as relying on a distinction between individual and institutional hypocrisy. My discussion of political hypocrisy overlaps significantly with what Thompson refers to as institutional hypocrisy. For a discussion of the difference between institutional and individual hypocrisy, see Dennis Thompson, "Hypocrisy and Democracy," Liberalism without Illusions, ed. Bernard Yack (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1996).
19. Jacob Levy notes that the "multiculturalism of fear and of rights are not assimilable to one another" in "The Liberalism of Fear," Critical Review 10 (Spring 1996): 12.
20. This argument was most commonly expressed in editorials. Edward Said has recently expressed his outrage at U.S. claims to be acting for humanitarian reasons. See Andy Pollack, "D.S. accused of 'immensely destructive role' globally since end of Cold War," Irish Times (June 24, 1999), 11 . For an argument against this comparison, see also Susan Sontag's "Why Are We In Kosovo?" The New York Times (May 2, 1999), Section 6; 52.
21. This argument was most commonly expressed in editorials. Edward Said has recently expressed his outrage at U.S. claims to be acting for humanitarian reasons. See Andy Pollack, "D.S. accused of 'immensely destructive role' globally since end of Cold War," Irish Times (June 24, 1999), 11 . For an argument against this comparison, see also Susan Sontag's "Why Are We In Kosovo?" The New York Times (May 2, 1999), Section 6; 52.
22. Robert Hayden, "Humanitarian Hypocrisy" available at 〈http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/hayden.htm〉
23. Juliet O'Neill, "Law professor seeks war-crimes trial for NATO," The Ottawa Citizen (May 16, 1999), A7. As can be seen in Mandel's statement, anger at hypocrisy can motivate individuals to press charges and encourages active political participation.
24. For examples of such a view, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979) or Hans J. Morganthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1985).
25. For examples of such a view, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979) or Hans J. Morganthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1985).
26. For a discussion of some recent criticisms made against realism, see Charles Kegley, "The Neo-idealist Moment In International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities." International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993): 134.
27. See Kathryn Skikkink, Thomas Risse, and Stephen Ropp, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
28. Though I do not discuss this case here, sometimes hypocrisy can involve individuals who deceive themselves about their moral status. For a discussion of ways that people engage in this self-deception, see Bela Szabados, "Hypocrisy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (June 1979).
29. As Louis Gawthrop noted, one meaning of the term "hypocrite" is "an ability to render fine-tuned legal distinctions, to interpret God's Law with hairsplitting scrupulosity," in Public Service and Democracy (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1998), 30.
30. Notice that I ascribe actions to states and speak of a state's commitment to morality. Some people may find such talk problematic. The problem of collective action is one that I cannot adequately address here. I think that there is an important point in talking about state actions and commitments: the norms and practices of the institutions that make up a state shape the behavior of those who play roles within those institutions, so the actions of a state are not simply the sum of the actions of its individual political actors. But since I cannot here fully defend this idea, I want, for present purposes, my talk of a state's actions to be understood simply as shorthand for actions people undertake in their political institutional roles.
31. See Dennis Thompson, "The Problem of Many Hands," Political Ethics and Public Office (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
32. For a thorough discussion of lying, see Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choices In Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Bok identifies one difference between the liar and the hypocrite: "Hypocrites half believe their own stories" (Lying, 84). Bok's distinction refers only to self-deceiving kinds of hypocrisy.
33. Publicly announcing one's moral principles, e.g., 'I believe that it is always wrong to lie," is going to count as explicitly presenting oneself as someone who never lies.
34. Some point to the U.S. domestic treatment of criminals, African-Americans, and other minorities to suggest the hypocrisy comes from pointing fingers at despicable behavior in other countries while turning a blind eye to its own domestic forms of abuse. For a discussion of the reluctance of the United States to investigate its own abuses, see Joe Stork, "Human Rights and U.S. Policy," Foreign Policy in Focus for Policy 8, (March 1999).
35. The problem of dirty hands involves a choice between two course of action in which there is a clear moral preference for one course of action. For the classic formulation for the problem of dirty hands, see Michael Walzer's "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," War and Moral Responsibility: Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1874), 62-82.
36. The hypothetical example is based on a recent controversy between UN debt payment and international family planning programs. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright described the administration's views of the compromise reached as "deeply dissatisfied" with restrictions on aid to family planning groups that it reluctantly accepted in order to obtain money to pay U.S. debts to the United Nations in the fiscal 2000 budget. See Steven Mufson, "Albright Promises Family Planning Funds; Next U.S. Budget Will Restore Losses From U.N. Debt Compromise, Secretary Says," The Washington Post (November 25, 1999), A06.
37. I recognize that a hypocrite could also plead her case to the public; however, the more that politician's redemption involves a personal "cost," the more likely such acts of redemption indicate the person is a tragic compromiser.
38. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), Ch. 3.
39. Shklar, Freedom and Independence, 187.
40. It is unclear whether hypocrisy need always involve conscious misrepresentation since the hypocrite's avowed standards of proper conduct are what condemn the actions. When a person unknowingly acts in ways that contradict his public statements or when the person changes his mind about his standards, the acts don't quite seem as hypocritical. Accusations of hypocrisy can have the additional instrumental effect of revealing unintended 'hypocrisy.'
41. William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 187.
42. See U.S. State Department Report "Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo." Released May 10, 1999 at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/hrreport/homepage.htrn.
43. Le Rochefoucauld, The Harper Book of Quotations. 3rd ed., ed. Robert Fitzhenry (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993), 225.
44. Frankly, in my mind, it is an open question whether NATO's intervention was, all things considered, morally justified.
45. I recognize that the UN Charter has only a minimal impact on international relations. Nevertheless, my argument about hypocrisy is based on how public officials appealed to the UN Charter to justify the intervention to U.S. citizens as well as to the international community.
46. My discussion of NATO's decision largely draws on Mary O'Connell's insightful article, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 57-88.
47. Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," European Journal of International Law 10 (1999): n. 13.
48. Secretary Albright, "NATO: Preparing for the Washington Summit," Prepared Statement for the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, in 9. U.S., Dept St. Dispatch, (December 1998) at 1: 3.
49. Some scholars have argued for a right of humanitarian intervention, that is, the right to take offensive military action without Security Council authorization to protect human rights; however, there is "no treaty permitting humanitarian intervention, nor any real evidence of a general practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation to support the right of humanitarian intervention under customary law"(O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 70).
50. John Donnelly, "At UN, Clinton says U.S. can't stop brutalities by itself," The Boston Globe (September 22, 1999), A1.
51. Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime," American Journal of International Law 124 (1999): 2.
52. Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," 15.
53. Such a position is ironic considering that the United States pushed for an international organization while Winston Churchill wanted the regional approach to international law.
54. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia vs. United States of America) 1999 ICJ Pleadings (Verbatim Record: Request for the indication of provisional measures). 1.7 (11 May 1999), available on, 〈http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm〉
55. Bruno Simma suggested though the "potential boomerang effect of such breaches can never be excluded, . . . this danger can at least be reduced by indicating the concrete circumstances that led to a decision ad hoc being destined to remain singular" in "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," 22.
56. O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 83.
57. For an interesting and useful discussion of the emergence of regional peacekeeping missions, see Michael Hirsh, "Calling All Regio-Cops: Peacekeeping's Hybrid Future," Foreign Affairs 79 (November/ December 2000): 2-8.
58. Jeffry Laurenti, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force," background paper prepared for the United Nations Association of U.S.A. (1999).
59. O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 71.
60. See "East Timor-Will the United Nations make another blunder," The Jarkarta Post (June 18, 1999).
61. Abdul Oroh, executive director of the Lagos, Nigeria-based Civil Liberties Organization, claimed that "there is racism behind it all. They cannot deny that they are involved in Bosnia and Kosovo because they are while people. They should apply (equal) standards to prevent humanitarian disasters happening wherever they are happening" (Ann Simmons, "Why AIM them and Not U.S.?' Africa Asks," Toronto Star (April 25, 1999).
62. Jeremy Rabkin, "A New World Order The Clinton Doctrine could be turned against the D.S.," The American Spectator 32 (August, 1999): 50-51.
63. Carlotta Gall, "Crisis in the Balkans," The New York Times (May 14, 1999). A12.
64. Vaclav Havel claimed that "This war places human rights above the rights of the state. (This war) happened out of respect for the law, for a law that ranks higher than the law which protects the sovereignty of states. The alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and international legal documents dictate." in "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State," The New York Review (June 10, 1999): 6.
65. President Clinton admitted that the desire to end violence "does not mean our response in every case can or should be the same. Sometimes, collective military force is both appropriate and feasible. Sometimes, concerted economic and political pressure combined with diplomacy is a better answer"(Donnelly, "At UN, Clinton says U.S. can't Stop Brutalities by itself," A1).
66. O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 73.
67. O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 87.
68. O'Connell, "The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo," 87.
69. Dirty hands arguments can also be used hypocritically. Public officials can pretend to feel guilty or justify a cruel decision by appealing loo readily to expediency. I would like to thank Dennis Thompson for reminding me of this point.
70. Ruth Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 2.
71. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 125.
72. See Allen Buchanan, "The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention," Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 71-87.
73. I am indebted to Allen Buchanan for this point.
74. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 44.
75. Though "putting cruelty first might help one to decide who the victim of any movement is," it does not settle "the confusion, skepticism, misanthropy and other assorted intellectual muddles" that come with political commitments (Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 22). Shklar's ranking of the vices is one way to interject clarity into political agendas; however, her attempt to prioritize outside of a given political context and at the expense of institutional effects fails to consider the instances when the elimination of hypocrisy must occur in order to eliminate cruelty.
76. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 44.
77. David Rieff, "The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights," The New York Times (August 8, 1999), Section 6, 37.
78. Some may argue that economic reforms are necessary for political reforms to occur.
79. Such tensions have been highlighted by a number of recent theorists. Most recently, Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice has attempted to reconcile the tensions between democratic processes and a commitment to justice. Other theorists, such as Charles Beitz's discussion of political equality or Melissa Williams's analysis of representation, point out similar tensions in liberal ideas. See Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice (London: Yale University Press, 1999); Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
80. Such tensions have been highlighted by a number of recent theorists. Most recently, Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice has attempted to reconcile the tensions between democratic processes and a commitment to justice. Other theorists, such as Charles Beitz's discussion of political equality or Melissa Williams's analysis of representation, point out similar tensions in liberal ideas. See Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice (London: Yale University Press, 1999); Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
81. Such tensions have been highlighted by a number of recent theorists. Most recently, Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice has attempted to reconcile the tensions between democratic processes and a commitment to justice. Other theorists, such as Charles Beitz's discussion of political equality or Melissa Williams's analysis of representation, point out similar tensions in liberal ideas. See Ian Shapiro's Democratic Justice (London: Yale University Press, 1999); Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
82. Many forms of the incarceration of convicted felons in the United States are unjustifiably cruel in my opinion. Amnesty International has recently documented the horrors of using restraints on pregnant prisoners, employing male prison guards to supervise female prisoners, and the so-called 'supermaximum security' segregation units, "where growing numbers of prisoners were kept in long-term isolation in small, sometimes windowless cells, in conditions of reduced sensory stimulation" (Amnesty International Report 2000 at http:/www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/countries).
83. Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear," 30.
84. For an instructive discussion of moral remainders, see Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and The Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
85. Shklar, "Liberalism of Fear," 31, 33.
86. Though I take this insight from Friedrich Nietzsche, the connection between norms and power has been emphasized by both Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor, 1990) and Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
87. Though I take this insight from Friedrich Nietzsche, the connection between norms and power has been emphasized by both Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor, 1990) and Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
88. Like Shklar, I am wary of the rhetorical devices used to cope with "the fact of pluralism" - that is, to focus on the authenticity of a person's belief instead of disagreeing with the content of his or her belief. Shklar reinvigorates public discussions by demanding that the eradication of cruelty needs to be put first. However, my discussion has shown that hypocrisy and cruelty can sometimes be inextricably linked so that one's political agenda cannot be arranged according to lexical preferences.