Determining trade policy: Do voters hold politicians accountable?

International Organization

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 533-557

  Guisinger, Alexandra ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 74349126941     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309090183     Document Type: Article

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