Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment

Journal of International Money and Finance

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 19-36

  Mitchener, Kris James ^a,b   Weidenmier, Marc D ^b,c  

^a SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Gunboat diplomacy; Reputation; Sanctions; Sovereign debt; Sovereign default

Indexed keywords

EID: 72649093422     PISSN: 02615606     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2008.12.011     Document Type: Article

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