Acceding to the norm: The accession of LDCs to the WTO

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 7-35

  Hawthorne, Helen ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accession process and negotiations; Bargaining coalitions; General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT); International norms; Least developed countries (LDCs); Multilateral trade regime; Norm life cycle; Trade diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Indexed keywords

EID: 72449172442     PISSN: 18711901     EISSN: 1871191X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187119109X394304     Document Type: Article

References (191)

1. The G20 is a coalition of developing countries which was formed in 2003 prior to the Cancun ministerial conference. Its main focus was the agricultural negotiations and its original members were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. Membership of the group has changed since it was first established, and as of June 2008 its website (see http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/history.asp) lists the following countries as current members of the group: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The formation and continued involvement of the G20 demonstrates the increased participation of developing countries in the WTO, as most of its members are larger developing countries and only one is an LDC.
2. The Cotton-4 (C4) are a group of West African cotton-producing least-developed countries-Mali, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso-that submitted a proposal to the Cancun conference regarding cotton subsidies.
3. The African Group is composed of members of the African Union that are also WTO members.
4. Formally classified by the UN in 1971, this group now accounts for 49 countries worldwide, with the majority based in Africa (this figure takes into account the recent graduation of Cape Verde from the category). Of the 49 LDCs, only 32 are currently members of the WTO. Within the WTO, the LDCs are in the unique position of being a recognized category of membership, as well as being a negotiating coalition. For a list of the WTO's LDC members, see the Appendix.
5. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in January 1948, as a provisional agreement dealing with trade until the planned International Trade Organization (ITO) was established. Despite being a provisional agreement, the GATT remained the main international treaty dealing with trade until the establishment of the WTO in 1994.
6. The WTO was established as a result of the GATT's Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. It came into Effect in January 1995, following the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement by the GATT's contracting parties.
7. However, it should be noted that the potential for impact via councils and committees will be limited if the LDC does not have a permanent office in Geneva.
8. As noted above, LDCs are both a category of WTO member and a coalition, but LDCs are also members of other coalitions, most notably the African Group.
9. See WTO, 'Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy', accessed online at www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif- e/org3-e.htm on 18 April 2007.
10. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, vol.52, no.4, autumn 1998, pp. 887-917.
11. Wayne Sandholtz, 'Dynamics of Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder', European Journal of International Relations, vol.14, no.1, 2008, pp. 101-131.
12. For example, Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organization: The Architecture of International Trade Regulation (London: Routledge, 2000), looks at the normative framework of the organization, but does not consider the impact of external norms on the WTO, such as the norm of special treatment for LDCs.
13. While Wilkinson does not especially focus on the role of coalitions in the WTO, or on LDCs, those works that do, such as Amrita Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT and WTO (London: Routledge, 2003), again do not focus on norms.
14. See Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries
15. and David Deese, World Trade Politics: Power, Principles and Leadership, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
16. See Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 890.
17. See Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1995);
18. and Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 'Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos', in Peter J Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
19. Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 24.
20. Klotz uses a norms' approach to demonstrate how anti-apartheid activists used international institutions to circumvent the opposition of the great powers.
21. See Vaughn P. Shannon, 'Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation', International Studies Quarterly, vol.44, no.2, June 2000, p. 294.
22. Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 24.
23. From Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change';
24. Sandholtz, 'Dynamics of International Norm Change', pp. 101-131.
25. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 891.
26. Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 13.
27. Sandholtz, 'Dynamics of Norm Change', p. 102.
28. See Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and the Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 29.
29. The strength of this method is that it is possible to produce a trajectory of a norm over time. High incidence of compliance indicates a strong norm, while low incidence indicates a weak norm. A change in compliance can indicate an external change that has impacted the norm in some way. The key weakness of this method can be in identifying the norm's Influence in the past.
30. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', pp. 895-896.
31. The idea of the tipping point is similar to Thomas Kuhn's idea of a paradigm shift, where a significant body of theory needs to be developed to support the new paradigm and be accepted by a significant number of scientists, before a paradigm shift can occur. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
32. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 896.
33. Ann Marie Clark's book on Amnesty International provides a good example of the emergence of different human rights norms and Amnesty's role as the norm entrepreneur; see Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience.
34. Michael Barnett, 'Social Constructivism', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 252-270.
35. See Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience, p. 28.
36. This attempt at differentiating among developing countries was controversial at the time, as developing countries were resistant to any formal differentiation, as this was seen as harmful to their solidarity. For more information on this, see UN, The History of UNCTAD, 1964-1984 (New York: UN, 1985).
37. On differentiation of developing countries, see Gilbert R Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 94.
38. Norms build on previous norms, so to track the development of the norm of special treatment for LDCs we need to go back to the 1960s and the norm of special treatment for developing countries generally.
39. The 1981 LDC conference was held in Paris; the second LDC conference was held in 1991 in Brussels; and the third LDC conference was again held in Paris.
40. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 897.
41. This is again similar to the case where new paradigms compete with existing ones; see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
42. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 900.
43. GATT, Tokyo Declaration, paragraph 6, document no. MIN(73), 1973. This is one of the first mentions of LDCs in official GATT documents.
44. Gilbert Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 94.
45. The sub-committee's first meeting was held in November 1980 and was open to all GATT members that wanted to attend, not just LDCs.
46. For example see GATT, Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries: Proposals for Action in Favour of the Least-Developed, document no. COM.TD/LLDC/W/22, 23 May 1985;
47. and GATT SubCommittee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Communication from Bangladesh: Uruguay Round and the Least-Developed Countries, document no. COM.TD/LLDC/W/37/Rev.1, 23 November 1988.
48. GATT Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Note on Proceedings of the Tenth Meeting, document no. COM.TD/LLDC/11/Rev.1, 15 December 1988. This remark was made by the chair man, Martin Huslid of Norway.
49. Also see GATT Sub-Committee on Trade of Least-Developed Countries, Note on Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting, document no. COM.TD/LLDC/14, 5 November 1991, where the remark was repeated by the sub-committee's new chairman Erik Selmer.
50. GATT, GATT Contracting Parties Thirty-Eighth Session: Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 29 November 1982, document no. L/5424, paragraph 7(iv)(b).
51. GATT, GATT Contracting Parties Thirty-Eighth Session: Report of the Committee on Trade and Develop ment to the Contracting Parties, document no. L/5401, 2 November 1982, para. 4. Unfortunately I This not possible to identify directly individual countries in the report.
52. WTO, 'The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization', in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 4.
53. These can be found in the Preamble; Article IV on the Structure of the WTO; and Article XI on Original Membership.
54. These can be found in the Preamble; Part IX Article 15 on Special and Differential Treatment; and twice in Part X Article 16 on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
55. In the Preamble; and Article I V.
56. In the Preamble; and Article 66.
57. See Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries, pp. 183-185.
58. Also see UNCTAD, 'Press Release: Marginalized Countries Table Comprehensive Trade Agenda for WTO Ministerial Conference', document no. TAD/INF/PR/9913, 9 July 1999. However, minutes of the LDC sub-committee indicate that a loose grouping existed prior to this.
59. WTO, Declaration of the Ministers of Trade of the Least-Developed Countries, Seattle, 29 November 1999, document no. WT/L/343, p. 2.
60. The Quad is made up of the United States, European Union, Canada and Japan. The package was mainly concerned with market access of the LDCs; see WTO, 'WTO Briefing Note: Ministers Start Negotiating Seattle Declaration', 1 December 1999, accessed online on 7 July 2008 at http://www.wto. org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99-e/english/about-e/resum01-e.htm.
61. The Doha Declaration contains mentions of LDCs in the following paragraphs: 2; 3;
62. 9 (accession); 15 (services); 16 (Market Access of Non-Agricultural Products);
63. 21 and 22 (Relationship between Trade and Investment);
64. 24 and 25 (Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy); 26 (Transparency in Government Procurement);
65. 28 (WTO Rules);
66. 32 and 33 (Trade and Environment);
67. 36 (Trade, Debt and Finance);
68. 39 (Technical Cooperation and Capacity-building);
69. 42 and 43 (section on LDCs); 88 44 (Special and Differential Treatment);
70. and 50 (Organization and Management of the Work Programme). Note that some paragraphs contain more than one mention of LDCs.
71. See WTO, Doha Development Agenda: Ministerial Declaration, document no. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para. 42, which states: 'We reaffirm the commitments we undertook at LDC-III, and agree that the WTO should take into account, in designing its work programme for LDCs, the trade-related elements of the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action, consistent with the WTO's man date, adopted at LDC-III'.
72. WTO, Doha Work Programme: Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 18 December 2005, document no. WT/Min(05)/DEC, para. 47. IThis significant that developing countries are encouraged to assist LDCs as well as developed countries, but DFQF is part of the single undertaking and thus will not become a legal requirement until the Doha Round is concluded.
73. For more on Aid for Trade, see Dominique Njinkeu and Hugo Cameron (eds.), Aid for Trade and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
74. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 895.
75. Thomas Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialization of Human Rights Norms', in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1.
76. Sandholtz, 'Dynamics of Norm Change', p. 101.
77. Sandholtz, 'Dynamics of Norm Change', p. 103.
78. Roman Grynberg and Roy Mickey Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO: Lessons from the Multilateral Trading System', in Roman Grynberg (ed.), WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multi lateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 694.
79. For example, Donna Lee and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.), The WTO after Hong Kong: Progress in and Prospects for, the Doha Development Agenda (Oxford: Routledge, 2007);
80. Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 2001);
81. Deese, World Trade Politics; Homi Katrak and Roger Strange (eds.), The WTO and Developing Countries (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004);
82. Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006);
83. and Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds.), Trade Politics (London: Routledge, 2004).
84. Exceptions include John H Barton, Judith Goldstein, Timothy E Josling and Richard H Steinberg, The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law and Economics of the GATT and the WTO (Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006);
85. and Bernard M. Hoekman and Michael M Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
86. For general studies on accession, see Michael Tomz, Judith Goldstein and Douglas Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges: The Impact of GATT on International Trade', 14 June 2004, p. 3, accessed online at http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE04/Papers/tomz.pdf on 25 February 2008;
87. and International Organization, vol.61, no.1, January 2007.
88. For example, Thomas Rumbaugh and Nicolas Blancher, China: International Trade and WTO Acces sion, IMF Working Paper (Washington DC: IMF, 2004), accessed online at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ ft/wp/2004/wp0436.pdf on 3 July 2008;
89. and Damedin Tsogtbaatar, 'Mongolia's WTO Accession: Expectations and Realities of WTO Membership', in Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low and Andrew L Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
90. For example, see UNCTAD, Least-Developed Countries Report (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2004), chapter 4;
91. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 694;
92. Ratnakar Adhikari and Navin Dahal, LDCs' Accession to the WTO: Learning from the Cases of Nepal, Cambodia and Vanuatu (Kathmandu: South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), 2004);
93. Samnang Chea and Hach Sok, 'Cambodia's Accession to WTO: "Fast-Track" Accession by a Least-Developed Country', in Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low and Andrew L. Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
94. P.R. Rajkarnikar, 'Nepal: The Role of an NGO in Support of Accession', in Gallagher, Low and Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation
95. Daniel Gray, 'Vanuatu's Suspended Accession Bid: Second Thoughts?', in Gallagher, Low and Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation;
96. and Pierre Sauvé, 'Economic and Social Adjustment Costs of Accession to the World Trade Organization: Cambodia and Nepal', in Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review, vol.1, no.1, April 2005.
97. Most of these states also joined the UN in the same year as becoming independent. The two notable exceptions to this rule were Zambia and Lesotho, which did not join the GATT until 1982 and 1988 respectively, despite becoming independent in 1964 and 1966.
98. See Kenneth W. Dam, GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 109.
99. GATT, Article XXVI on 'Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration', 1947.
100. For example, the UK agreed to apply the GATT for the whole of its empire apart from Jamaica, although it subsequently adopted the agreement for Jamaica just prior to independence, while France adopted the agreement for 'all its overseas territories except Morocco, which was viewed as an extension of France'; see Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', pp. 4-5.
101. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', p. 3;
102. also International Organization, vol.61, no.1, January 2007.
103. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', p. 7.
104. GATT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXVI:5
105. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', p. 5, quoting from GATT document BISD 10S/73.
106. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo (see GATT, Council Minutes, 29 June 1971, document no. C/M/70) and Bangladesh (GATT, Accession of The People's Republic of Bangladesh, decision of 10 November 1972, document no.L/3371) appear to have acceded to the GATT under Article XXXIII.
107. See also'Accession of Zaire and Romania', Keesing's Record of World Events, vol.17, November 1971, pp. 24940, which notes that the DRC 'had preferred to negotiate a fresh basis for adherence' to the GATT.
108. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', p. 6.
109. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', pp. 6-7.
110. GATT, GATT Membership Reaches 96 as Lesotho Joins, document no. GATT/1428, 1988, emphasis added.
111. GATT, Mali becomes a Contracting Party to GATT, document no. GATT/1563, 1993.
112. GATT, Newly Independent States: Status under Recommendations of 18 November 1960, 9 December 1961 and 14 November 1962, document no. L/1947.
113. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 'Membership has its Privileges', p. 7.
114. GATT, GATT Membership as at 1 June 1986, document no. GATT/1386. The LDCs in the de facto membership list are Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, the Solomon Islands and Yemen. Of this list of LDCs, only Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique and the Solomon Islands converted their de facto member ship to full membership; the de facto membership for the rest expired with the WTO's establishment.
115. See Adhikari and Dahal, LDCs' Accession to the WTO, p. 3.
116. See GATT, Admission of Senegal as a Contracting Party, document no. L/2065, 1963.
117. Also see GATT, Newly Independent States: De Facto Application of the GATT, document no. C/38, 1962;
118. GATT, Newly Independent States, document no. L/1947, 1986;
119. GATT, GATT Membership as at 1 June 1986, document no. GATT/1386;
120. and GATT, Application of the General Agreement to Newly Independent States, document no. L/5345, 1982.
121. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 694.
122. This situation is known as 'WTO-plus', with acceding members made to liberalize markets more than existing WTO members.
123. The following countries are considered to be members of the RAMs group: Albania; Armenia; China; Croatia; Ecuador; Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Jordan; Kyrgyz Republic; Moldova; Mongolia; Oman; Panama; Saudi Arabia; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Vietnam. None of these countries are LDCs.
124. The RAMs submitted a proposal to the WTO (document ref: TN/AG/GEN/24) in 2007 calling for the countries to be allowed smaller tariffcuts and longer implementation periods than other developing countries for any Doha Round agreements, because of commitments that they had already made in the accession process. For more details, see WTO, Negotiating Proposal by Recently Acceded Members (RAMs), TN/AG/GEN/24, 2007;
125. and ICTSD, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol.11, no.4, March 2007.
126. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, para. 58, adopted 18 December 2005, document no. WT/MIN(05)/ DEC.
127. The issue of shorter implementation periods is often referred to as the 'WTO-minus' situation.
128. Sauvé, 'The Economic and Social Adjustment Costs of Accession to the World Trade Organization', p. 38.
129. WTO, Cape Verde Working Party Report, document no. WT/ACC/CPV/30, 2007, p. 39;
130. and WTO, Vanuatu Working Party Report, document no. WT/ACC/VUT/13, 2001, p. 22.
131. See WTO, General Council Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Accessions to the WTO, Communication from the European Communities, document no. WT/GC/W/153 (Geneva: WTO, 8 March 1999);
132. WTO, General Council Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Communication from Egypt on behalf of African Group, document no. WT/GC/W137 (Geneva: WTO, 26 January 1999);
133. WTO, The Challenge of Integrating LDCs into the Multilateral Trading System: Coordinating Workshop for Senior Advisors to Ministers of Trade in LDCs in Preparation for Third WTO Ministerial Conference, Sun City, South Africa 21-25 June 1999, document no. WT/GC/W251 (Geneva: WTO, 1999);
134. and UNCTAD, Least-Developed Country Report, 2004, p. 62.
135. For example, Afghanistan and Sudan.
136. ICTSD, 'General Council Paves Way for Ukraine to join WTO', Bridges Weekly Trade News, 7 Febru ary 2008.
137. There are currently 30 countries in the process of accession to the WTO, eleven of which are LDCs. These are: Afghanistan; Algeria; Andorra; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Belarus; Bhutan; Bosnia and Herze govina; Comoros; Equatorial Guinea; Ethiopia; Iran; Iraq; Kazakhstan; Lao Peoples Democratic Repub lic; Lebanese Republic; Republic of Liberia; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Montenegro; Russian Federation; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principe; Serbia; Seychelles; Sudan; Tajikistan; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; and Yemen.
138. For more details on the benefits to LDCs of joining the WTO, from a liberal perspective, see Oxfam, Getting the Fundamentals Right: The Early Stages of Afghanistan's WTO Accession Process, Briefing Paper no.92 (Oxford: Oxfam International, June 2007);
139. and Simon J Evenett and Carlos A. Primo Braga, WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience, World Bank Trade Note 22 (Washington DC: World Bank, 6 June 2005).
140. Cambodia applied to join the WTO in 1994; Nepal originally applied to join the GATT in 1989, followed by WTO application in 1995; and Cape Verde's accession package was approved by the General Council in 2007, and following domestic ratification it was scheduled to join the WTO on 23 July 2008.
141. Eleven LDCs are currently involved in the accession process.
142. The focus on accession in the run up to Seattle was because of expectations that a new round of mul tilateral negotiations would be launched and a debate about how acceding countries would be treated in the negotiations.
143. See WTO, General Council, 9-11 and 18 December 1998, Minutes of Meeting, document no. WT/GC/M/32 (Geneva: WTO, 9 February 1999);
144. and WTO, General Council, 15 June 1999, Minutes of Meeting, document no. WT/GC/M/40/Add.3 (Geneva: WTO, 5 July 1999), for more on these discussions.
145. WTO, 'Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO', article XII, p. 12.
146. WTO, Marrakesh Agreement.
147. WTO, General Council, 9-11 and 18 December 1998, Minutes of Meeting, pp. 35-41;
148. WTO, General Council, 15 June 1999, Minutes of Meeting, pp. 21-26.
149. WTO, document no. WT/GC/W/251, 1999, p. 3, para. 11.
150. WTO, General Council Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Accessions to the WTO, Communication from the European Communities, p. 1, para. 2;
151. and WTO, General Council Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Accession of LDCs, Communication from Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, document no. WT/GC/W/378 (Geneva: WTO, 26 October 1999).
152. WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Status of Least-Developed Countries' Accession to the World Trade Organization, document no. WT/LDC/SWG/IF/11/Rev.2 (Geneva: WTO, 19 April 2001).
153. LDC, 'Draft Zanzibar Declaration', 2001, accessed via South Centre website, online at http://www. southcentre.rorg/info/media/04/04.htm on 11 February 2008, italics in the original text.
154. LDC, 'Draft Zanzibar Declaration', 2001.
155. WTO, Doha Development Agenda, 2001, paras 9 and 42.
156. For examples, see the following WTO documents: WTO, 2001, document no. WT/COMTD/33;
157. WTO, 2002, document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M/29;
158. WTO, 2003, document no. WT/COMTD/ LDC/M33;
159. WTO, 2003, document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M/34;
160. and WTO, 2004, document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M36. It should be noted that WTO committees are open to all members, thus the members of the LDC sub-committee are not only LDCs.
161. UNCTAD, The Least-Developed Countries Report, chapter 3 entitled 'Selected Recent Policy Trends: Accession of LDCs to the WTO' (New York: United Nations, 2004), pp. 49-64.
162. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 712.
163. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 696.
164. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 705.
165. The 'other significant WTO applicants' could potentially be seen as China and Russia. Grynberg and Joy noted that the United States did not agree to Vanuatu's request for transition periods of two years on the Agreement on Customs Valuations and TRIPs; see p. 711.
166. WTO, General Council, 9-11 and 18 December 1998, Minutes of Meeting, p. 38.
167. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 705, footnotes.
168. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 708.
169. Grynberg and Joy, 'The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO', p. 709.
170. This highlights the two-level nature of the WTO's accession negotiations.
171. Finding more evidence to support the claim that Vanuatu's difficulties acted as a catalyst for reasserting the norm has been very difficult because of the secretive nature of WTO accessions, and particularly this one. A review of General Council minutes between 1999 and 2005 revealed only one indirect reference, in July 2005, to Vanuatu's accession, despite several discussions on accession. The 'stalled' accession of Vanuatu appears to be the 'elephant in the room' that no one talks about. However, subsequent events strongly indicate that the Vanuatu case did indeed act as a catalyst.
172. WTO, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, decision of 10 December 2002, document no. WT/L/508.
173. WTO, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, decision of 10 December 2002, document no. WT/L/508.
174. Maxine Kennett, Simon J. Evenett and Jonathon Gage, Evaluating WTO Accessions: Legal and Economic Perspectives (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Research Centre, 2005), p. 64, accessed online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/WBI-Training/ EvaluatingWTO Accessions-partI.pdf on 25 February 2008.
175. WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, 'Note on the Meeting of 18 October 2007', Forty-Eighth Session, document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M/48, p. 17.
176. Kennett, Evenett and Gage, Evaluating WTO Accessions, p. 64.
177. WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, 'Note on Meeting of 21 May 2003, Thirty-third Session', document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M/33, p. 4.
178. WTO, General Council Establishes Working Party for Equatorial Guinea, WTO News item, 5 February 2008, accessed online on 27 February 2008 at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08-e/acc-equatorial- guinea-feb08-e.htm.
179. Memorandums were received from Bhutan, Cape Verde and Ethiopia; Working Party meetings were held for Bhutan (three), Cape Verde (three), Lao (two), Sudan (two) and Yemen (three).
180. WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu, document no. WT/ACC/VUT/3/Rev.5 (Geneva: WTO, 19 October 1999). Membership of the Working Party is listed as: Australia; Canada; the European Communities and member states; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Singapore; Switzerland; and the United States.
181. Michiko Hayashi, 'Arrested Development: Vanuatu's Suspended Accession to the World Trade Organization', 2003, accessed online on 11 September 2008 at www.vanuatu.usp.ac.f/library/online/vanuatu/hayashi.pdf
182. For the first Working Party list, see WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, document no. WT/ACC.KHM/1/Rev.2 (Geneva: WTO, 17 January 2002)
183. and for the sixth revision, see WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, document no. WT/ACC/KHM/1/Rev.6 (Geneva: WTO, 23 July 2003).
184. WTO, Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Nepal, document no. WT/ACC/NPL/4/ Rev.7 (Geneva: WTO, 18 February 2003).
185. See WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Cape Verde, document no. WT/ACC/CPV/2/Rev.1 (Geneva: WTO, 4 May 2004);
186. and for the final Working Party, see WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Cape Verde, document no. WT/ACC/CPV/2/Rev.6 (Geneva: WTO, 4 July 2007). The ten LDC members are: Benin; Burkina Faso; Democratic Republic of Congo; Djibouti; Haiti; Mauritania; Mozambique; Rwanda; Senegal; and Zambia.
187. WTO, 'Notes of the Meeting of 18 October 2007', document no. WT/COMTD/LDC/M/48, p. 16.
188. WTO, 'Notes of the Meeting of 18 October 2007', p. 16.
189. See Trebilcock and Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, p. 22;
190. and Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 19.
191. WTO, 2002, document no. WT/L/508.