The role of experience in the gambler's fallacy

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 117-129

  Barron, Greg ^a   Leider, Stephen ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Description; Experience; Gambler's fallacy; Recency

Indexed keywords

EID: 72449134703     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.676     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Ayton, P., & Fisher, I. (2004). The gambler's fallacy and the hot-handed fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1369-1378.
2. Bar-Hillel, M., & Wagenaar, W. A. (1991). The perception of randomness. Advances in Applied Mathematics, 12, 428-454.
3. Barron, G., & Erev, I. (2003). Feedback-based decisions and their limited correspondence to description-based decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 215-233.
4. Budescu, D. V. (1987). A markov model for generation of random binary sequences. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 13,25-39.
5. Burns, B. D., & Corpus, B. (2004). Randomness and inductions from streaks: Gambler's Fallacy versus Hot Hand. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 179-184.
6. Erev, I., & Barron, G. (2005). On adaptation, maximization, and reinforcement learning among cognitive strategies. Psychological Review, 112, 912-931.
7. Estes, W. K. (1964). Probability learning. In A. W. Melton (Ed.), Categories of human learning (pp. 88-128). New York: Academic Press.
8. Fox, C. R., & Hadar, L. (2006). Decisions from experience = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004). Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 159-161.
9. Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295-314.
10. Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Elke, W., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choices. Psychological Science, 15, 534-539.
11. Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1992). Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 1-55.
12. Jarvik, M. E. (1951). Probability learning and a negative recency effect in the serial anticipation of alternative symbols. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41, 291-291.
13. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
14. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430-454.
15. Laplace, P. S. (1951). A philosophical essay on probabilities (translated by F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory). New York: Dover.
16. Lee, W. (1971). Decision theory and human behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
17. McDonald, F., & Newell, B. (2008). Effects of alternation rate and prior belief on the interpretation of binary sequences (Working Paper). Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales, School of Psychology.
18. Newell, B. R., & Rakow, T. (2007). The role of experience in decisions from description. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14,1133-1139.
19. Oskarsson, A., Van Boven, L., Hastie, R., & McClelland, G. (2009). What's next? Judging sequences of binary events. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 262-285.
20. Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton.
21. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 9, 195-230.
22. Weber, E. U., Blais, A. R., & Shafir, S. (2004). Predicting risk sensitivity in humans and lower animals: Risk as variance or coefficient of variation. Psychological Review, 111, 430-445.