Convertibles in sequential financing

Review of Finance

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 727-760

  Wang, Susheng ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71949129792     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfn024     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Alderson, M. J., Betker, B. L., and Stock, D. R. (2006) Investment and Financing Activity Following Calls of Convertible Bonds, Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 895-914.
2. Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1992) An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies 77, 338-401.
3. Asquith, P. (1995) Convertible Debt: A Dynamic Test of Call Policy, unpublished manuscript, Sloan School of Management, MIT.
4. Asquith, P. and Mullins, D. Jr. (1991) Convertible Debt: Corporate Call Policy and Voluntary Conversion, Journal of Finance 46, 1273-1289.
5. Baker, M. andWurgler, J. (2002) Market Timing and Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 57, 1-32.
6. Brennan, M. and Kraus, A. (1987) Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Finance 42, 1225-1243.
7. Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. (1988) The Case for Convertibles, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1, 55-64.
8. Chakraborty, A. and Yilmaz, B. (2006) Asymmetric Information and Financing with Convertibles, working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
9. Che, Y. K. and Hausch, D. (1999) Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, American Economic Review 89, 125-147.
10. Constantinides, G. and Grundy, B. (1989) Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals, Review of Financial Studies 2, 445-465.
11. Cornelli, F. and Yosha, O. (2003) Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, Review of Economic Studies 70, 1-32.
12. Cuny, C. J. and Talmor, E. (2005) The Staging of Venture Capital Financing: Milestone vs. Rounds, working paper, Texas A&M University.
13. Demski, J. S. and Sappington, D. (1991) Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 232-240.
14. Edlin, A. S. and Hermalin, B. E. (2000) Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 16, 395-423.
15. Gitman, L. J. (2003) Principles of Managerial Finance, 10thedition, Addison Wesley.
16. Gorman, M. and Sahlman, W. (1989) What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business Venturing 4, 231-248.
17. Green, R. (1984) Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 115-136.
18. Hellmann, T. (2006) IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital, Journal of Financial Economics 81, 649-679.
19. Jensen,M. (1986) The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-329.
20. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
21. Jen, F., Choi, D., and Lee, S. H. (1997) Some Evidence on Why Companies Use Convertible Bonds, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 10, 44-53.
22. Korkeamaki, T. P. and Moore, W. T. (2004) Convertible Bond Design and Capital Investment: The Role of Call Provisions, Journal of Finance LIX, 391-405.
23. Lewis, C. M., Rogalski, R. J., and Seward, J. K. (1998) Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries, and Convertible Debt Security Design, Journal of Financial Intermediation 7, 32-59.
24. Mayers, D. (1998) Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options,Journal of Financial Economics 47, 83-102.
25. Mayers, D. (2000) Convertible Bonds: Matching Financial And Real Options, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13, 8-21.
26. Myers, S. C. and Majluf, M. S. (1984) Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.
27. N̈oldeke,G. and Schmidt,K.M. (1995) Option Contracts and Renegotiation: a Solution to the Hold-up Problem, Rand Journal of Economics 26, 163-179.
28. N̈oldeke, G. and Schmidt, K. M. (1998) Sequential Investments and Options to Own, Rand Journal of Economics 29, 633-653.
29. Sahlman, W. A. (1990) The Structure and Governance of Venture-capital Organizations, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 473-521.
30. Schmidt, K.M. (2003) Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance, Journal of Finance LVIII, 1139-1166.
31. Stein, J. C. (1992) Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity Financing, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 3-21.
32. Trester, J. J. (1998) Venture Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 675-699.
33. Wang, S. and Zhou, H. (2004) Sequential Financing in Venture Capital: Moral Hazard and Risks, Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 131-155.