Impure public goods and technological interdependencies

Journal of Economic Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 596-615

  Löschel, Andreas ^a   Rübbelke, Dirk T G ^b  

^a CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

^b CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Consumer goods; Environmental management; Financial benefits; Germany; Public sector organizations

Indexed keywords

EID: 71849112425     PISSN: 01443585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/01443580911001751     Document Type: Article

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