The choice of policy instruments to control pollution under costly enforcement and incomplete information

Journal of Applied Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 207-227

  Chávez, Carlos A ^a   Villena, Mauricio G ^b   Stranlund, John K ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONCEPCIÓN   (Chile)

^b UNIVERSIDAD ADOLFO IBÁÑEZ   (Chile)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

cost effectiveness; enforcement costs; environmental policy; incomplete information

Indexed keywords

EID: 71649084139     PISSN: 15140326     EISSN: 16676726     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1514-0326(09)60013-1     Document Type: Article

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