Enforcing emissions trading programs: Theory, practice, and performance

Policy Studies Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 343-361

  Stranlund, John K ^a   Chavez, Carlos A ^b   Field, Barry C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONCEPCIÓN   (Chile)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; EMISSIONS TRADING; INCENTIVE; POLLUTION POLICY; SULFUR EMISSION;

EID: 0037967163     PISSN: 0190292X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2002.tb02151.x     Document Type: Article

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