Chapter 94 Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger's Law

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2008, Pages 889-897

  Rietz, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71449097725     PISSN: 15740722     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00094-7     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. Black D. The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2. Condorcet M.d.M.J.A.N.C. Essai sur l'Application de l'Aalyse à la Probabilité des Decisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix (1785), L'Imprimerie Royale, Paris
3. Duverger M. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. B. North and R. North, trans (1967), Methuen and Company, London
4. Felsenthal D.S. Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation (1990), Praeger Publishers, New York
5. Felsenthal D.S., Rapoport A., and Maoz Z. Tacit cooperation in three alternative noncooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behavior under the plurality procedure. Electoral Studies 7 (1988) 143-161
6. Forsythe, R., Rietz, T.A., Weber, R.J. (1994). "Theory, outcomes and individual voter behavior in two candidate elections with voting costs". Mimeo, University of Iowa
7. Forsythe R., Myerson R.B., Rietz T.A., and Weber R.J. An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories. Social Choice and Welfare 10 (1993) 223-247
8. Forsythe R., Myerson R.B., Rietz T.A., and Weber R.J. An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-way elections. The International Journal of Game Theory 25 (1996) 355-383
9. Gerber, E.R., Morton, R.B., Rietz, T.A. (1996). "Majority requirements and minority representation". Mimeo, University of Iowa
10. Gerber E.R., Morton R.B., and Rietz T.A. Minority representation in multi-member districts. The American Political Science Review 92 (1998) 127-144
11. McKelvey R.D., and Ordeshook P.C. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory 36 (1985) 55-85
12. McKelvey R.D., and Ordeshook P.C. Rational expectations in elections: Some experimental results based on a multidimensional model. Public Choice 44 (1985) 61-102
13. McKelvey R.D., and Ordeshook P.C. A decade of experimental research on spatial models of elections and committees. In: Hinich M.J., and Enelow J. (Eds). Government, Democracy, and Social Choice (1990), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
14. Myerson R.B., and Weber R.J. A theory of voting equilibria. American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 102-114
15. Peterson, G. (1998). "East Coast information and West Coast elections: How the release of early election results can alter election outcome". Ph.D. thesis, University of Iowa, Department of Political Science
16. Plott C.R. A comparative analysis of direct democracy, two-candidate elections and three-candidate elections in an experimental environment. In: Palfrey T.R. (Ed). Laboratory Research in Political Economy (1991), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
17. Rapoport A., Felsenthal D.S., and Maoz Z. Sincere versus strategic behavior in small groups. In: Palfrey T.R. (Ed). Laboratory Research in Political Economy (1991), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
18. Rietz T.A. Comportamiento estratégico en elecciones con múltiples alternativas: Una revisión de alguna evidencia experimental. Cuardernos Economicos de ICE 54 (1993) 129-170
19. Rietz T.A., Myerson R.B., and Weber R.J. Campaign finance levels as coordinating signals in three-way, experimental elections. Economics and Politics 10 (1998) 185-217