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Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 39-45

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of poker strategies

Author keywords

No Limit Texas Hold'em poker; Poker strategies; Replicator Dynamics; Simplex analysis

Indexed keywords

STABILITY;

EID: 70549092148     PISSN: 18759521     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcom.2009.09.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (35)

References (23)
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    • Automated trading agents versus virtual humans: An evolutionary game-theoretic comparison of two double-auction market designs
    • New York, NY
    • S. Phelps, S. Parsons, P. McBurney, Automated trading agents versus virtual humans: an evolutionary game-theoretic comparison of two double-auction market designs, in: Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, New York, NY, 2004.
    • (2004) Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce
    • Phelps, S.1    Parsons, S.2    McBurney, P.3
  • 11
    • 0034661690 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolution of biological information
    • Schneider T. Evolution of biological information. Journal of NAR 28 (2000) 2794-2799
    • (2000) Journal of NAR , vol.28 , pp. 2794-2799
    • Schneider, T.1
  • 16
    • 0017819644 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
    • Taylor P., and Jonker L. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40 (1978) 145-156
    • (1978) Mathematical Biosciences , vol.40 , pp. 145-156
    • Taylor, P.1    Jonker, L.2
  • 23
    • 0019461509 scopus 로고
    • Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts
    • Zeeman E. Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology 89 (1981) 249-270
    • (1981) Journal of Theoretical Biology , vol.89 , pp. 249-270
    • Zeeman, E.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.