Quick and smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 36, Issue SUPPL. VOL. 32, 2007, Pages 3-27

  Jones, Karen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449787324     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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