The authority of peremptory norms in international law: State consent or natural law?

Nordic Journal of International Law

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 133-175

  Dubois, Dan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Basic goods; International law; Jus cogens; Natural law; Peremptory norms; Positivism; Practical reasonableness; Public order; State consent; Voluntarism

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449392441     PISSN: 09027351     EISSN: 15718107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181009X431730     Document Type: Article

References (171)

1. J.L. Kunz, 'Natural Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law', 55 American Journal of International Law (1961) 958.
2. Throughout the article the terms jus cogens norms, jus cogens rules and peremptory norms will be used interchangeably. This is done to avoid having to continuously refer to them solely as "jus cogens norms".
3. A. Verdross, 'Forbidden Treaties in International Law', 31 American Journal of International Law (1937) 571-572.
4. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 489.
5. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
6. Ibid., Article 53.
7. Ibid., Article 64.
8. Case no. IT-95-17.1-T, 10 December 1998, Trial Chamber, para. 153.
9. D. Shelton, 'International Law and "Relative Normativity"', in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 154.
10. See both the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 26 April 1968, ICJ, Judgment, J. C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 72 [North Sea Continental Shelf case] and the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ICJ, Preliminary Objections and Merits, Judgment, J. C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
11. For a more complete treatment of the judicial consideration of jus cogens norms, see Shelton, ibid., pp. 154-157.
12. Throughout the paper I will be using the terms "voluntarist" and "positivist" interchangeably. However, it is important to point out that these terms are not exactly synonymous. Although all voluntarist accounts of jus cogens norms are positivist, not all positivist accounts of international law are voluntarist. For example, some positivists argue that a State's obligation under international law arises from their self-interest. For reasons of brevity, however, I will limit my criticism to the voluntarist account of jus cogens norms. Another example and perhaps the most notable positivist account of international law that is not voluntarist is that put forward by Hans Kelsen. Kelsen recognised that the foundations of international law could not simply be the willing consent of States and that the validity of law must rely on one hypothetical norm, the grundnorm, whose legitimacy was simply presupposed. See H. Kelsen, "The Essence of International Law', in K.W. Deutsch and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The Relevance of International Law: Essays in Honor of Leo Gross (Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1968) p. 88 [The Essence of International Law] and Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. B.L. Paulson and S. Paulson (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) p. 108.
13. H. Thirlway, "The Sources of International Law', in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 125.
14. North Sea Continental Shelf cast, supra note 10, para. 77
15. J.H. Currie et. al., International Law. Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2007) p. 141.
16. C. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1976) p. 78.
17. Currie et al., supra note 14, p. 136.
18. M. Janis, 'Nature of Jus Cogens', 3 Connecticut Journal of International Law (1988) 360.
19. M. Byers, 'Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules', 66 Nordic Journal of International Law (1997) 220-229.
20. Ibid., M. Byers, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law pp. 221-222.
21. Ibid., M. Byers, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law p. 222.
22. Ibid. M. Byers, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law
23. Ibid. M. Byers, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law
24. See Verdross, supra note 3, pp. 571-572.
25. Byers, supra note 18, p. 224.
26. Byers, supra note 18, p. 224. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 225.
28. Byers, supra note 18, p. 224. Ibid.
29. Supra note 5.
30. Of course such a "paradox" only exists for the positivist. For natural lawyers it is in no way paradoxical that jus cogens norms are non-derogable, largely because they do not view State consent as being the source of international law's authority.
31. Byers, supra note 18, pp. 226-227. Byers cites H. Mosler, "The International Society as a Legal Community, 140 R.d.C. (1974) p. 33.
32. Ibid., p. 227.
33. Ibid., p. 228, emphasis in the original.
34. Thirlway, supra note 12, p. 142.
35. A. Verdross, 'Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law', 58 American Journal of International Law (1966) 56. The list of doctrinal scholars who held this view is quite substantive and includes such thinkers as: Francisco Suarez, Christian Wolff, Emerie Vattel, J. L. Brierly and Hersch Lauterpacht.
36. J.L. Brierly, Sir Humphrey Waldock (ed.), The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963) p. 55.
37. S. Hall, "The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism', 12 European Journal of International Law (2001) 287.
38. R. Ago, 'Positivism and International Law', 51 American Journal of International Law (1957) 702.
39. H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., London, 1927) p. 56.
40. M. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed. (Aspen, New York, 2003) p. 66.
41. Ibid. M. Janis, An Introduction to International Law
42. See discussion surrounding note 29.
43. L. Oppenheim, International Law, vol.1, 1st ed. (Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, London, 1905) pp. 17-18
44. as cited in Hall, supra note 36, p. 289.
45. Hall, supra note 36, p. 289.
46. Lauterpacht, supra note 38, p. 53.
47. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) pp. 83-85. However, the absence of any coercive threat can certainly impact the effectiveness of a legal norm. Coercion can reinforce a legal obligation but not constitute it.
48. See the discussion surrounding note 37.
49. R.P. George, 'Natural Law and International Order', in R.P. George (ed.), In Defence of Natural law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) p. 228.
50. J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980) p. 3.
51. R.P. George, 'Natural Law and Positive Law', in R.P. George (ed.), In Defence of Natural law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) p. 103.
52. Finnis, supra note 48, pp. 86-90.
53. Finnis, supra note 48, pp. 100-101.
54. Ibid., emphasis in the original.
55. Ibid., pp. 103-126.
56. Ibid., p. 126.
57. George, supra note 49, p. 107.
58. John Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 247.
59. Finnis, supra note 48, p. 145.
60. Ibid., p. 155.
61. Ibid., p. 154.
62. G. Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol.2 (Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago, 1983) p. 847.
63. George, supra note 49, p. 107.
64. George, supra note 49, p. 107 Ibid.
65. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
66. George, supra note 47, pp. 234-235.
67. Finnis, supra note 56, pp. 226-227.
68. EG. Carozza, "The Universal Common Good and the Authority of International Law', 9 Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture (2006) 32-33.
69. George, supra note 47, p. 235.
70. As Carozza reminds us, these two are not in conflict: " [I]t is because of the antecedent, ontologi-cal unity of the human family and a common human nature that interaction and interdependence are capable of generating that affective bind characteristic of the common good as a concrete reality." See Carozza, supra note 66, pp. 33-34.
71. Ibid., p. 35, and George, supra note 47, p. 236.
72. George, supra note 47, p. 239.
73. See discussion surrounding notes 38 to 46. It is important to note that even though the VCLT has been ratified by nearly all States, it only describes the legal effect of jus cogens norms and cannot provide, as we will see later, a sufficient account for their authority.
74. This was the view adopted by the Mexican delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, who stated: "The rules of jus cogens [are] those rules which derive from principles that the legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexistence in the international community." Suarez (Mexico) U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONE/39/11/Add.2 (1977) p. 294
75. as cited in K. Parker and L.B. Neylon, 'Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights', 12 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review (1989) 415.
76. See also C.A. Ford, 'Adjudicating Jus Cogens', 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal (1995) 152
77. and E.M. Kornicker Uhlmann, 'State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms', 11 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (1999) p. 102.
78. G.A. Christenson, 'Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society', 28 Virginia Journal of International Law (1988) 585.
79. For an excellent, and recent, discussion of this idea see chapter one of 'Peremptory Norms as International Public Order', in A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) pp. 7-35.
80. For example, the idea that peremptory norms are rooted in the conscious of the international community and are indispensable for the existence of international law was emphasised in an opinion of the German Federal Constitutional Court: "The quality of such peremptory norms may be attributed only to such legal rules as are firmly rooted in the legal conviction of the community of nations and are indispensable to the existence of the law of nations as an international legal order and the observance of which can be required by all members of the international community." Judgement of April 7, 1965
81. Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVertfGE, W. Ger., quoted in Riesenfeld, 'Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law: In the Light of a Recent Decision of the German Supreme Constitutional Court', 60 American Journal of International Law (1966) 513.
82. Thirlway, supra note 12, pp. 141-142.
83. Mustafa Kamil Yaseen (Iraq), Summary Records of the 17th Session, 828th meeting, U.N. Doc. A/ CN.4/156
84. and Addenda, in Yearbook of The International Law Commission 1966, vol.1, para. 29, as cited in Ford, supra note 72, p. 152.
85. Ibid., p. 248
86. as cited in Uhlmann, supra note 72, p. 104.
87. Verdross, supra note 34, p. 57.
88. Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A, in Yearbook of The International Law Commission 1966, vol.2, pp. 247-248.
89. For the wording of Article 53, see discussion surrounding note 6.
90. Supra note 6.
91. Christenson, supra note 73, p. 594.
92. E. Jimenez de Arechaga, 'International Law in the Past Third of a Century', 159 R. d. C. (1978) 64
93. as cited in A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) p. 201.
94. Statement of the representative of Poland, supra note 80, p. 302.
95. Statement of the representative of Israel, UNCLOT, 1st Sess., 1969, p. 311.
96. Statement of the representative of Zambia, supra note 80, p. 322.
97. G.M. Danilenko, 'International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making', 2 European Journal of International Law (1991) 45.
98. Supra note 77.
99. Comments of Radhabinod Pal, I.L.C. Report on the Work of Its Fifteenth Session, U.N. General Assembly, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9m UN Doc. A/5509, pp. 11-12
100. as cited in Verdross, supra note 34, p. 57.
101. Orakhelashvili, supra note 74, p. 67.
102. Ibid., pp. 27-31.
103. Case concerning the application of Hague Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), 28 November 1958, ICJ, Judgement, J.C.J. Reports 1958, pp. 106-107
104. as cited in ibid., p. 28.
105. A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) pp. 213-214
106. as quoted in Orakhelashvili, supra note 74, p. 28.
107. Orakhelashvili, supra note 74, p. 28.
108. Ibid., p. 38.
109. See discussion surrounding note 83.
110. A.L. Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation', 74 Nordic Journal of International Law (2005) 308-310
111. and Uhlmann, supra note 72, p. 104.
112. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 28 May 1951, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. No.15, p. 23
113. as cited in Uhlmann, ibid.
114. Uhlmann, ibid.
115. Paulus, supra note 99, citing C. Tomuschat, 'Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World', in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Boston, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) pp. 8-9.
116. Verdross, supra note 34, p. 58.
117. Parker and Neylon, supra note 72, pp. 429-430.
118. Brownlie, Principles supra note 4, pp. 488-489.
119. The inclusion of the non-derogability of jus cogens norms as one of the accepted peremptory norms may strike one as circular. However, this is only the case if we define the authority of the rule from its legal effect. Something that my account does not do. See Ford, supra note 72, p. 165.
120. Ibid., and Cassese, supra note 84, pp. 202-203, and Parker and Neylon, supra note 72, pp. 429-430.
121. Cassese, ibid., and Parker and Neylon, ibid., pp. 432-435.
122. Parker and Neylon, Neylon, ibid.; Ford, supra note 72, p. 165, and Verdross, supra note 34, pp. 59-60.
123. Uhlmann, supra note 72, pp. 115-133, for a detailed argument to include protection of the global environment as a peremptory norm
124. and see also, Cassese, supra note 84, p. 202.
125. This categorisation differs from that of Ulrich Scheuner who proposed three distinct groups. The first dealing with those norms which protect the foundations of law and peace, such as the prohibitions on genocide, slavery or the use of force. The second group being those for peaceful cooperation, as in the freedom of the high seas, and, third, those dealing with the protection of "human dignity, personal and racial equality, life and personal freedom". U. Scheuner, 'Conflict of Treaty Provisions with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law', 27 Zeitschrift Für Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkkerrecht (1967) pp. 526-527
126. as cited in Christenson, supra note 73, p. 615, note 128. My categorisation differs because although it, like Scheuner's, categorised the norms based on the interests it protects, understands these interests differently. For example, the prohibition on slavery does not guarantee peace but rather protects human dignity and a number of the basic goods including the ability of individuals to choose their own life plans as required by practical reasonableness as understood in section 2 of this paper. My categorisation resembles that found in G. D. Haimbaugh, 'Jus Cogens Root&Branch (An Inventory)', 3 Touro Law Review (1987) pp. 212-222, where peremptory norms are classified as either (1) peace and security or (2) human rights. 1H) As cited by Shelton, supra note 9, 159.
127. Verdross, supra note 3, p. 574.
128. Parker and Neylon, supra note 72, pp. 430-431.
129. See also the ICJ's description of erga omnes obligations in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 5 February 1970
130. ICJ, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32 [Barcelona Traction].
131. This is, of course, not to deny the importance of its positive authority, which stems from the existence of the Convention.
132. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 99, p. 23.
133. See Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 12 January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S 277.
134. See discussion surrounding notes 50 and 54.
135. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) p. 71.
136. Parker and Neylon, supra note 72, pp. 441-443.
137. The South West Africa case (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 18 July 1966
138. ICJ, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 298 (Tanaka J., dissenting)
139. as cited in ibid., p. 442.
140. L. Sohn, "The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States', 32 American University Law Review (1982) 14
141. as cited in ibid.
142. Barcelona Traction, supra note 113, p. 304.
143. Parder and Neylon, supra note 72, p. 442.
144. This list is adopted and somewhat modified by that discussed in Finnis, supra note 48, p. 214.
145. Ibid., emphasis in the original.
146. Ibid., emphasis in the original.
147. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, Article 26.
148. See the discussion surrounding note 97.
149. I recognise that this sort of account involves an infinite regress of explanations that needs to continually rely on the necessity of each step of non-derogability relying on a subsequent level of non-derogability. In other words, the non-derogability of the non-derogability of peremptory norms is itself non-derogable and so on and so on. However, it simply has to be the case, and is in this sense-self evident, much like our inquiries into the basic goods, that the non-derogability of peremptory rules is necessary to the effective existence of these rules. Our inquiries into the authority of this rule can simply end here.
150. L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) In International Law. Historical Development, Criteria, Present Development (Finnish Lawyer's Publishing Company, Helsinki, 1988) p. 214.
151. G. Simpson, 'Book Review of Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) In International Law. Historical Development, Criteria, Present Development by Lauri Hannikainen', 13 Australia Year Book of International Law (1991) 182.
152. J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) p. 3.
153. H. Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations (Mcgraw Hill, New York, 1993) pp. 253-269.
154. L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd ed. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979) pp. 329-332.
155. M.E. O'Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law, Insights from the Iheory and Practice of Enforcement (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) p. 7.
156. Ibid., M.E. O'Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law, Insights from the Iheory and Practice of Enforcement p. 8.
157. Ibid., M.E. O'Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law, Insights from the Iheory and Practice of Enforcement p. 7-8.
158. As O'Connell notes, the sanctions in international law enforcement tend to be of the self-judging and self-help variety and that what is truly lacking in international law is a compulsory system of dispute resolution. This view of legal sanctions was also shared by Kelsen and Henkin. See Kelsen, "The Essence of International Law', supra note 11, and Henkin, supra note 134, p. 54.
159. This lecture was originally delivered in Florence in May of 2004 and was subsequently published as M. Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal', 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) 113-125.
160. While this lecture continues many of the themes developed by Koskenniemi in From Apology to Utopia, I have limited my discussion to his criticisms in the keynote lecture as they are more recent and more pointed towards the concept of jus cogens. See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, Helsinki, 1989) pp. 281-283.
161. Ibid., M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument p. 122.
162. Ibid. M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument
163. Ibid., M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument p. 116.
164. Ibid., M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument p. 123.
165. Perhaps the most famous of which being that the interior angles of a triangle will always when described in two dimensions equal 180 degrees. I say two dimensions here because in at least two circumstances where the triangle is drawn on the surface of a sphere or where the triangle's sides are beams of light, the sum of the angles will not necessarily be 180 degrees. Due to the shape of the sphere, or the distortions caused by gravity on the beams of light, the angles of the triangle will not be 180 degrees. However, this only impacts the ability of Euclidean geometry to describe physical space and these later principles emanating from non-Euclidian geometry and Einstein's theory of general relativity are themselves universal in the very same way that Euclidean geometry is. Their universality is not challenged by their foundation in a particular mathematical tradition and apply in each society.
166. Finnis, supra note 48, pp. 83-84.
167. See the discussion surrounding note 66.
168. P.-M. Dupuy, 'Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi', 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) 134.
169. Ibid., P.-M. Dupuy, 16 European Journal of International Law p. 135.
170. Ibid. P.-M. Dupuy, 16 European Journal of International Law
171. Ibid. P.-M. Dupuy, 16 European Journal of International Law