Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 324-335

  D'Mello, Ranjan ^a   Miranda, Mercedes ^b  

^a WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DEARBORN   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Debt issues; Overinvestments

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449130498     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.07.021     Document Type: Article

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