Joint agency: Intersubjectivity, sense of control, and the feeling of trust

Inquiry

Volumn 52, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 500-515

  Seemann, Axel ^a  

^a BENTLEY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449106724     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201740903302634     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Some of the foundational texts are: Searle, J. (1990) "Collective intentions and actions", in: P. Cohen & M. Pollack (Eds.), Intention and Communication, pp. 401-15 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press);
2. Bratman, M. (1992) "Shared cooperative agency", The Philosophical Review, 101 (2), pp. 327-41;
3. Gilbert, M. (1996) "Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon", in: M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation, pp. 177-94 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield);
4. Bratman, M. (2006) "Dynamics of sociality", Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 30 (1), pp. 1-45.
5. For an excellent overview, see Tollefsen, D. (2004) "Collective intentionality", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
6. Seemann, A. (2007) "Joint attention, collective knowledge, and the 'we'-perspective", Social Epistemology, 21 (3), pp. 217-30.
7. I ought to point out my indebtedness to a talk of Elisabeth Pacherie's about the sense of control in joint agency at the conference "Self and Other in Philosophy and Neuroscience" that took place at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London in December 2007.
8. Campbell, J. (1995) Past, Space, and Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
9. Chisholm, R. (1995) "Agents, causes, and events: The problem of free will", in: T. O'Connor (Ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, pp. 95-100 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
10. Elisabeth Pacherie approvingly quotes Wakefield and Dreyfus (1991), who draw attention to the distinction between the difference between an action experience and one of "being passively moved about". See Pacherie, E. (2007) "The sense of control and the sense of agency", Psyche, 13(1), pp. 1-30;
11. Wakefield, J. & Dreyfus, H. (1991) "Intentionality and the phenomenology of action", in: E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick (Eds.), John Searle and His Critics, pp. 259-70 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell).
12. Davidson, D. (1980) "Actions, reasons, and causes", in: D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 3-20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press);
13. Searle, J. (1983), Intentionality, pp. 79-111 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
14. Pacherie (2007, p. 6) describes the relevant sense of agency as "occurrent and immersed": as the sense of agency one is experiencing when performing a particular action, and as "the kind of non-reflective experience one has when one is fully engaged in an activity...".
15. See Pacherie (2007).
16. Seemann, A. (2008) "Person perception", Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), pp. 245-62.
17. Hobson, P. R. (2007) "We share, therefore we think", in: D.D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, pp. 41-62 (Dordrecht: Springer).
18. See also Reddy, V. (2005) "Before the 'third element': Understanding attention to self" in: N. Eilan et al. (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, pp. 85-109 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
19. Hobson, R. P. (2005) "What puts the jointness into joint attention?", in: N. Eilan et al. (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, pp. 185204 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
20. I follow Stefan Wiens' usage of the term "interoception" here. See Wiens, S. (2005) "Interoception in emotional experience", Current Opinion in Neurology, 18(44), pp. 442-47.
21. Gilbert, M. (1989) On Social Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
22. Shaun Gallagher expands on Merleau-Ponty to argue the point that it isn't the image of the other's body that is the infant's focus of attention; rather, it is her action and expression: Gallagher, S. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind (Clarendon Press: Oxford), p. 82.
23. For a comprehensive account of various simulationist approaches to face-based emotion recognition, see Goldman, A.I. (2006) Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 113.
24. See Seemann (2008) for an argument to that extent.
25. For an argument in favour of the idea that intentional directedness in a creature's doings, and its perception, do not presuppose semantic (or representational) capacities, see Hutto, D. (2008) Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 41.
26. Baier, A. (1986) "Trust and antitrust", p. 234, Ethics, 96, pp. 231-60;
27. Jones, K. (1996), "Trust as an affective attitude", p. 5., Ethics, 107, pp. 4-25.
28. It should be noted that I am concerned with a very particular kind of trust here. There are important arguments against a general account of trust in terms of "good will": see Holton, R. "Deciding to trust, coming to believe", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 63-76.
29. Becker, L.C. (1996) "Trust as noncognitive security about motives", Ethics, 107, pp. 43-61.
30. Baier (1986).
31. Jones (1996).
32. Stueber, K. (2006) Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences, p. 20 f., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
33. Avramides, A. (2001) Other Minds (London: Routledge).
34. Strawson, P. (1959) Individuals (London: Methuen).