The uses and abuses of agency theory

Business Ethics Quarterly

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 497-528

  Heath, Joseph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350786343     PISSN: 1052150X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/beq200919430     Document Type: Article

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