Ising model versus normal form game

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

Volumn 389, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 481-489

  Galam, Serge ^a   Walliser, Bernard ^b  

^a Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee Ecole Polytechnique   (France)

^b Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques   (France)

Author keywords

2 2 game; Econophysics; Ising model; Sociophysics

Indexed keywords

ISING MODEL; PARETO PRINCIPLE; STATISTICAL MECHANICS;

ECONOPHYSICSS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NORMAL FORM GAMES; OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS; ONE-TO-ONE MAPPINGS; PHYSICAL MEANINGS; PRISONER'S DILEMMA; SOCIOPHYSICS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70350566670     PISSN: 03784371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.09.029     Document Type: Article

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