A paradigmatic shift for the Turkish generals and an end to the coup Era in Turkey

Middle East Journal

Volumn 63, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 581-596

  Aydinli, Ersel ^a  

^a BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARMED FORCES; CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; MILITARY GOVERNMENT; PARADIGM SHIFT; POLITICS; STRUCTURAL CHANGE;

EURASIA; TURKEY;

EID: 70350141713     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/63.4.13     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. "TESEV'e göre halk en çok orduya güveniyor" ["According to Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Public Trusts in Army Most"], Hürriyet, November 28, 1998; "En önemli sorun issizlik" ["The Most Important Problem Is Unemployment"], Hürriyet, March 31, 2004
2. Taha Akyol, "En güvenilir kurum, ordu" ["The Most Accredited Institution is the Army"], Milliyet, January 19, 2005
3. "Orduya güvenmek" ["Trusting in the Army"], Milliyet, October 4, 2006.
4. Tanel Demirel, "Türk Silahli{dotless} Kuvvetleri'nin Toplumsal Mesruiyeti Üzerine" ["On Societal Le-gitimacy of the Turkish Armed Forces"], Toplum ve Bilim, Summer 2002.
5. See as well his work "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 127-150.
6. Some examples of how the military exercised its power within the civilian realm and were limited by landmark transformations include the restructuring of the National Security Council and the removal of military personnel from civilian courts and the Higher Education Council.
7. Going back to the Ottoman understanding that it was the politicians who brought about the end of the Empire.
8. Ümit Cizre Sakalli{dotless}oglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," Com-parative politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1997), pp. 151-166.
9. This term is chosen in recognition of how the AKP has changed in recent years. The party may have come into power with the mobilizing force of a nucleus Islamist group, but in order to remain there and to keep as broad a base of support as possible, it has moved towards the center, while maintaining deep pro-Islamist sympathies.
10. A well-known journalist with links to the military admitted that despite being the "most trusted institution" in the country, the military does not want to garner the societal disapproval that comes with open interventions in civilian politics. See Metehan Demir, "Askerler CHp'ye çok kizgin" ["Soldiers Are Very Angry with the Republican People's Party"], radikal, August 20, 2007. Former Chief of Staff Yasar Büyükanit disagreed with this assessment that the military's moves might have ul-timately pushed society towards the politicians, but admitted that this was only his opinion. See "Büyükanit: Bildirinin seçim sonuçlarini etkiledigini sanmiyorum" ["Mr. Büyükanit: I Do Not Think That the Declaration Affected the Election Results"], Milliyet On-line news, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/30/son/sonsiy25/asp.
11. Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner, and Jurgen Kuhlmann, eds., Civil-Military rela-tions in Europe: learning from Crisis and Institutional Change (New York: Routledge, 2006).
12. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967)
13. Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," in Roman Kolkowicz, Soldiers, peasants, Bureaucrats (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982)
14. Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981)
15. Amos Perlmutter and William M. Leogrande, "The Party in Uniform: toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Com-munist Political Systems," The American political Science review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 778-789.
16. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)
17. David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military relation in latin America, new Analytical perspectives (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001)
18. Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, The politics of Anti-politics: The Military in latin America (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1997)
19. Alfred Stepan, rethinking Military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)
20. Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative politics, No. 26 (1993), pp. 111-122.
21. At first glance, there might appear an overlap between the European and American paradigms, but there is a key difference in that the former is based on a strong, core anti-military sentiment. For more on the American paradigm see: Samuel Huntington, Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957)
22. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003)
23. Morris Janowitz, The professional Soldier: A Social and Military portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960)
24. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American national Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
25. Marouf Hasian, Jr., "Dangerous Supplements, Inventive Dissent, and Military Critiques of the Bush Administration's Unitary Executive Theories," presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007), pp. 693-716.
26. For a critique of US civil-military relations in light of the Iraqi war, see Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (2007), pp. 97-108.
27. Douglas L. Bland, "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2001), pp. 525-540.
28. William Hale, Turkish politics and the Military (New York, London: Routledge, 1994), p. 58.
29. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World politics, Vol. 11 (1959), pp. 513-552 (519).
30. Several groups and guerilla movements, known as Kuvay-i Mil-liye, emerged to resist the invasion, yet these groups lacked organization. Rustow argues that the army's and the former military officers' involvement as the organizing element of resistance was a direct outcome of an appeal by the Anatolian masses.
31. H. Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 150.
32. The term "Islamist sympathizer" is used rather than Islamist, because for the purposes of this article President Gül is assumed to be more of a pragmatist who utilizes Islamist energy for political mobilization, rather than someone seeking a fundamental transformation of the nation into an Islamist state.
33. The confrontational manners are best characterized by the "prerogatives" approach to civilmilitary relations, in which military prerogatives are considered as something that always grow at the expense of societal interest. See Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Development of new nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)
34. Alfred Stepan, The Military in politics: Changing patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
35. Zeki Sarigil, "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 35 (2009), pp. 709-728.
36. Interestingly, the Turkish military's ability to reach out to society seems to even extend internationally. Turkish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, and even in Korea in the 1950s seem to have been able to develop bonds with the local populations. Thank you to Dr. Zeki Sarigil for personally bringing this to my attention.
37. Ersel Aydinli, Nihat A. Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1 (January/February 2006).This does not mean that it never adjusts to the changing environment, but such adjustments are generally initiated by the army itself, not from the outside. These are generally "stylistic" adjustments, and have been exemplified by Kemalist ideology's occasional adoption of more left-wing tones or more Turkish nationalistic tendencies and have enabled the military to appear responsive to and inclusive of society's desires.
38. James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1989), pp. 387-404. Additionally, those with a background in Ottoman history may find an interesting parallel between this practice and the recruitment of Janissaries in southeastern Europe during the Ottoman period.
39. Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 110.
40. In surveys on this question when the army was removed from the list of possibilities, the gov-ernment emerged as the most trusted institution. "Içinde ordu olmayan soru: En güvenilir hükümet-tir" ["In a Survey Excluding the Army: The Most Trusted Is the Government"], Hürriyet, Septem-ber 9, 2005. Moreover, there seems to be a new tone in society's communication with the army. A growing number of intellectuals, media figures, NGOs, and business representatives are increasingly critical of the military's involvement in politics. There has even emerged a liberal-Islamist alliance in Turkish intellectual life, the common denominator of which is its critical view of the army.
41. The author is aware that this usage of "society" appears to be stripping that body of its inherent fragmentation, but in recent years, with respect to the role of the military and democratic practices, there seems to be a greater homogenization - some might say alliance - among Turkey's liberal elite, conservative masses, and the Kurds. These formerly divergent political identities appear to be converging around the idea of democratic progress, which gives room to a more monolithic treatment of "society."
42. Özkök: AB yolu hata kaldi{dotless}rmaz" ["Özkök: The EU Path Does Not Tolerate Mistakes"], Zaman, October 19, 2003.
43. The vital reform packages, passed nearly a decade ago in response to requirements to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, included the reforming of the state secu-rity courts, the restructuring of the National Security Council, and the lifting of restrictions against public use of minority languages. The Turkish army leadership sees EU membership as a major sour-ce for economic and social advances that could serve social cohesiveness in Turkey.
44. "Özkök: AB yolu hata kaldi{dotless}rmaz" ["Özkök: The EU Path Does Not Tolerate Mistakes"], Radikal, October 30, 2004.
45. Interview with Özkök in Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cepehesi [The Commanders' Front] (Istanbul: Detay Yayincilik, 2007), p. 221.
46. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1965), p. 59.
47. Fikret Bila, "Sorun TSK degil AB'nin çifte tutumu" ["The Problem Is Not the Turkish Armed Forces But the EU's Double-Sided Attitude"], Milliyet, December 31, 2005.
48. Sükrü Küçüksahin, Interview with General Ki{dotless}vri{dotless}koglu, Hürriyet, March 10, 2008.
49. Küçüksahin, Interview with General Ki{dotless}vri{dotless}koglu, Hürriyet, March 10, 2008.
50. Özkök: AB yolu hata kaldi{dotless}rmaz" ["Özkök: The EU Path Does Not Tolerate Mistakes"], Hürriyet, March 11, 2008.
51. The one exception among recent retired Chiefs of Staffs is, unsurprisingly perhaps, Hilmi Özkök, who chose to settle in a private house on the Aegean rather than in an army compound.
52. This group includes the established business elite, major media institutions, and state-related trade unions and business chambers. Their commitment to secularization and secular principles established at the beginning of the Republic conflict with Islamist ideas.
53. This refers to a statement released during the night on the military's webpage, in which the army, in response to the government's plans to elect an "Islamist" to the presidency, protested with harsh language that appeared to threaten some form of intervention.
54. Fikret Bila, "Büyükani{dotless}t'i{dotless}n tebrik ziyaretindeki mesajlar" ["Mr. Büyükani{dotless}t's Messages at the Congratulatory Visit"], Milliyet, September 11, 2007.
55. The PKK uses northern Iraq as a safe haven. The TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) has therefore made occasional interventions into northern Iraqi territory in attempts to disrupt this strategic advantage that the insurgents have.
56. "Büyükanit: Direktif bekliyoruz, geldigi an gireriz" Intervene As Soon As It Comes"], Hürriyet, November 9, 2007.
57. "Terör örgütü demeyeni muhatap almayi{dotless}z" ["We Won't Deal with Anyone Who Doesn't Call the PKK a Terrorist Organization"], Hürriyet, October 4, 2007
58. "Erdogan: Barzani teröre yatakli{dotless}k ediyor" ["Erdogan: Barzani Is Nurturing Terror"], Hürriyet, October 30, 2007
59. "Büyükani{dotless}t'tan çok sert sözler" ["Very Harsh Words from Büyükani{dotless}t"], Hürriyet, October 1, 2007.
60. "Emekli askere orduevi yasagi{dotless} getiriliyor" ["Banning Army Guesthouses for Retired Officers"], Sabah, October 18, 2007.
61. "Büyükani{dotless}t: Devlet karar verecek" ["Büyükani{dotless}t: The Government Will Decide"], Hürriyet, March 25, 2008.
62. The name "Ergenekon" has been given to this investigation and trial by the investigating autho-rities and prosecutors in reference to a secret organization, alleged to have conducted illegal covert ac-tivities aimed at destabilizing the political environment and paving the way for a coup/intervention that would in turn produce a more security-minded administration. There have been analogies made between this alleged organization and the "Gladio" groups uncovered in some European countries after the Cold War, the goal of which was to conduct irregular warfare in the event of Communist occupation. For a useful resource in English see
63. Akin Unver, "Turkey's 'Deep State' and the Ergenekon Conundrum," policy Brief, Middle East Institute (April 2009), http://mei.edu/Publications/WebPublications/PolicyB-riefs/PolicyBriefArchive/tabid/539/ctl/Detail/mid/1611/xmid/597/xmfid/17/Default.aspx.
64. Press release, Turkish General Staff, September 2, 2008, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV-1-Basin-Yayin-Basin-Yayin-Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2008/BA_40.html.
65. Ismail Küçükkaya, "Basbug'un 'normallesme' stratejisi" ["Basbug's 'Normalization' Strategy"], Aksam, September 18, 2008.
66. Fikret Bila, "Org. Basbug Doneminin Çizgileri" ["Lines of Basbug's Term"], Milliyet, September 17, 2008.
67. "Org. Ilker Basbug 'un Genelkurmay askanligi Devir-Teslim Toreni Konusmasi" ["General Bas-bug's Speech at the General Staff Handover Ceremony"], August 28, 2008, http://www.tsk.tr/49. The full text of the speech can be found at http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html.
68. He was reported to have declared, "Those who present terrorist organizations' acts as success-ful [implying inadequacy of the army's performance], will be held responsible for future bloodshed." See "Org. Basbug'dan Sert Aciklama" ["Tough Words from General Basbug"], Hürriyet, October 15, 2008.
69. Interview by author with an anonymous Turkish Brigadier General, Ankara, December 5, 2006.