Comparer les productions législatives:Enjeux et méthodes

Revue Internationale de Politique Comparee

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 381-404

  Brouard, Sylvain ^a   Wilkerson, John ^a   Baumgartner, Frank R ^a   Timmermans, Arco ^a   Bevan, Shaun ^a   Breeman, Gerard ^a   Breunig, Christian ^a   Chaqués, Laura ^a   Green Pedersen, Christopher ^a   Jennings, Will ^a   John, Peter ^a   Jones, Bryan D ^a   Lowery, David ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349764648     PISSN: 13700731     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/ripc.163.0381     Document Type: Article

References (37)

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15. Les thèmes du Tableau 2 apparaissent dans les graphiques du bas vers le haut dans l'ordre (croissant)
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