What makes strong federalism seem weak fiscal resources and presidential-provincial relations in Argentina

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 651-676

  Benton, Allyson L ^a  

^a Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349590791     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: 17477107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjn032     Document Type: Article

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