The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 145, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 171-192

  Montague, Michelle ^a  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Content; Emotion; Frege puzzles; Intentionality; Logic; Phenomenology

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349504869     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9218-0     Document Type: Article

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