A framework for analyzing the economics of a market for grid services

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5745 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 28-45

  Mason, Robin ^a   Courcoubetis, Costas ^b   Miliou, Natalia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

Competitive equilibrium; Grid economics; Grid market; Grid services; Market failure; Spot market

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM; GRID ECONOMICS; GRID MARKET; GRID SERVICES; MARKET FAILURE; SPOT MARKET;

COMPETITION; GRID COMPUTING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RANDOM PROCESSES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 70349306406     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03864-8_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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