Rethinking folk-psychology: Alternatives to theories of mind

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 153-161

  Slors, Marc ^a   Macdonald, Cynthia ^b  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349193479     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790802245661     Document Type: Article

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