Normal accident theory versus high reliability theory: A resolution and call for an open systems view of accidents

Human Relations

Volumn 62, Issue 9, 2009, Pages 1357-1390

  Shrivastava, Samir ^a   Sonpar, Karan ^b   Pazzaglia, Federica ^c  

^a SWINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA   (Canada)

Author keywords

High reliability; Negentropy; Normal accident; Open system theory; Requisite variety

Indexed keywords

EID: 70249104720     PISSN: 00187267     EISSN: 1741282X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0018726709339117     Document Type: Article

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