Formulas for fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory royalty determination

International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 66-75

  Salant, David J ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Effcient component pricing rule; FRAND; Game theory; Intellectual property rights, proportional sharing rule, shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 70149098956     PISSN: 15393062     EISSN: 15393054     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4018/jitsr.2009010105     Document Type: Article

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