A game theoretic approach for trading discharge permits in rivers

Water Science and Technology

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 793-804

  Niksokhan, Mohammad Hossein ^a   Kerachian, Reza ^a   Karamouz, Mohammad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN   (Iran)

Author keywords

Cost reallocation; Game theory; NSGA II; The young bargaining theory; Trading discharge permits

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING THEORY; COOPERATIVE GAME; EFFICIENT TREATMENT; FUZZY RISK; INITIAL COSTS; INITIAL TREATMENT; MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS; MULTI-OBJECTIVE GENETIC ALGORITHM; NON-DOMINATED SORTING GENETIC ALGORITHM - II; NONDOMINATED SOLUTIONS; NSGA-II; OPTIMIZATION MODELS; PARETO FRONT; PERMIT POLICIES; RIVER SYSTEMS; RIVER WATER QUALITY; THE YOUNG BARGAINING THEORY; TRADING DISCHARGE PERMITS; TREATMENT COSTS; TREATMENT LEVEL; WATER QUALITY STANDARD;

COMMERCE; COSTS; DEPRECIATION; HYDRAULIC MODELS; QUALITY CONTROL; QUALITY MANAGEMENT; RISK ANALYSIS; RISK PERCEPTION; RIVERS; WATER CONSERVATION; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER POLLUTION; WATER QUALITY; WATER SUPPLY;

GAME THEORY;

RIVER WATER;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GAME THEORY; GENETIC ALGORITHM; MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS; RIVER DISCHARGE; TRADE; WATER QUALITY;

ARTICLE; COST CONTROL; GENETIC ALGORITHM; IRAN; METHODOLOGY; MONTE CARLO METHOD; RIVER; THEORETICAL MODEL; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER QUALITY; WATER STANDARD;

COST ALLOCATION; FUZZY LOGIC; GAME THEORY; GEOGRAPHY; IRAN; RIVERS; WATER POLLUTANTS, CHEMICAL; WATER PURIFICATION;

EID: 69749116824     PISSN: 02731223     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.2166/wst.2009.394     Document Type: Article

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