A critical review of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance

Information Technology Journal

Volumn 8, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 936-964

  Meng, Bo ^a  

^a SOUTH CENTRAL UNIVERSITY FOR NATIONALITIES   (China)

Author keywords

Coercer; Cryptographic primitive; Security protocol; Vote buyer

Indexed keywords

ARTS COMPUTING; AUTHENTICATION; ELECTRONIC VOTING;

COERCER; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES; DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION; DENIABLE ENCRYPTIONS; DESIGNATED VERIFIERS; SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; VOTE BUYER;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 69749102464     PISSN: 18125638     EISSN: 18125646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2009.934.964     Document Type: Review

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